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ABSTRACT

Social theorists have generally classified:the

phenomenon of holy war in one of two ways.

,

One school,

comprised mainly of secular scholars, has regarded religious
rhetoric at face value, assuming that because Jews,

Christians and Muslims share a history of holy war advocacy

in the development of their respective traditions, holy war
is the inevitable consequence of recurring.religious
fanaticism.

The other ..school, in an attempt, to fashion a

more spiritually minded discourse, portrays it as an

imperfect human at:tempt to aspire to a nobler ethic, an
actualization of the struggle between good and evil in the

physical environment of competition.

Both approaches are

fundamentally flawed. The first does not adequately apply
self-defined social scientific methodology to the study of

holy war, both in the examination of its latent and manifest
functions, or in its relative value as an instrument of

ideology.

The second is but a thinly disguised attempt to

defend the concept of religious militancy and to effectively
canonize its various practitioners.

Using ,the following

methodolbgy, I.will demonstrate how .holy war was waged as a
particular strategy of theocratic ideology and.facilitated
the cooperation of various constituencies in pursuit of

specific political and social agendas:

(1) Discussion, of the socio-political environments in which
theocracies (and then social movements) developed and

advocated holy war concepts in Judaic, Christian, and
Islamic history.

(2) Examination of holy war advocacy and its related

political agenda, vis-a-vis, the use of religion as
ideology and propaganda in Judaic, Christian, and Islamic
theocracies and social movements.

(3)Analysis of holy war's theoretical development and
philosophical approach in Judaic, Christian, and Islamic
tradition.

(4) Consideration of Holy Scripture's role in justifying and
explaining an accepted context of holy war in Judaic,
Christian, and Islamic culture.
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INTRODUCTION

It is the purpose of this thesis project to illustrate

how holy war concepts, particularly in the Judaic, Christian
and Islamic traditions, were instruments of religious

ideology formulated by theocratic states in an attempt to

promote a sense of cultural and political unity in times of
crisis.

Additionally, it will be demonstrated that once

these concepts were legitimized through state sanction they
were effectively absorbed into the prevalent social
environment, becoming effectual activist ideologies.

The

holy war mentality, therefore, appealed to a variety of
socio-political movements in pursuit of credibility and
political cohesion.

At both the state and activist level,

religion performed two functions.

First, it served as a

comprehensive ideology from which a common culture could be
proselytized.

Secondly, it acted as a propagandistic

instrument, providing justification for the relevant

political agenda and giving the average foot-soldier (or
activist) a compelling, if uncomplicated, reason to fight.
It is the intent of this thesis project to de-mystify the

process by which holy war has been waged throughout history

and to dispel the notion that the so-called "religious wars"
of the past Were the mere results of human fanaticism and

spiritual excess.

To facilitate a discussion in which holy war is seen as

an element of political strategy that has historically
utilized religion both as ideology and propaganda,
consideration must be given to the definition of terms-

Webster's New Lexicon refers to theocracy as "government by

priests or men claiming to know the will of God".^

This

,

definition, in a general sense, ignores the symbiotic
relationship between religion and politics and, more

specifically, eludes the process by which religious concepts

are expropriated, even mis-applied, by the power structure:
and utilized to their ultimate political advantage.

This

ambiguity of terms belies a larger academic malaise
concerning the general topic of religion, one which
perpetuates the unfortunate prejudices of centuries past.
If the social sciences can do no better than to suggest that

theocracies necessarily react to crises with an appeal to
fanaticism, then to what extent may we Say that the

principles of objective science have been applied at all?
The ultimate ethic of Science is objectivity.

It seems the

study of religion has been infected with a secular bias to .
the extent that a meaningful definition of holy war has been
replaced with the simplistic formula of fanaticism.
science can do better.

Surely

By definition, a theocracy is a type of government.
Governments are involved in the struggle for power, both

externally through foreign policies and diplomatic
relations, and internally as they interact with various

demographic groups within their own populations.

This

attempt to consolidate power results in actual, not

phantasmic or ethereal, conflicts that, in turn, demand
practical solutions.

Despite the nature of theocratic

power, and its origins in the development of spiritual
charisma (and, consequently, privileged status), the

political realities of government/ theocratic or otherwise,
always necessitate a political, perhaps even worldly,

response.

In the absence of any pre-existing political

ideology (which is really a phenomenon of the last few
centuries), theocracies may appeal to sentiments that

reflect the broadest cross-section of their populations and

that help to provide the very basis of their legitimacy and
access to power: i.e., religious beliefs.

This does not

presume that any given population is unified in a common

political or religious struggle; rather, religious ideology

appears during periods of intense crisis, when the socio
economic and political environment is threatened by

disunity, precisely as a method by which a particular
constituency may prevail and lead the community in a

decisive fashion.

Thus, within middle-eastern Judaism there

were indegenous Canaanite populations to contend with, among
Christians warring nobles hampered unity, and in the Arab
world powerful inter-tribal rivalries threatened to
extinguish the young Islamic nation.
A word must be said here concerning the use of the term

"nation" in the body of this paper.

It is commonly held

that nation-states are a product of the.modern political
era.

It is certainly true that modern states possess more

complex political ideologies and maintain more highly
developed economic systems than did ancient societies.
Borders are better established and national identity secured
in a more methodical fashion than in the past.

But surely,

there are exceptions to this rule; witness the birth pangs
of nationhood in Boznia-Herzogovina and the struggle for

ethnic identity in government.

Additionally, ancient

societies were possessed of fully operational (if not

complex) economic systems; they maintained long distance
trade with other states, enforced well-established

geographic borders, and developed cultural ties that held
their people together in times of crisis.

This latter

characteristic may be viewed as a primitive "nationalism"

precisely because it performed the same function during the
creation of states in the modern era.

As a method of

creating this nationalism, theocratic states utilized the

ideology of religion just as surely as modern states utilize
political ideology in the pursuit; of legitimacy.

For this

reason I used the terms nation^ state and kingdom

interchangeably within the body of this text^
The comroonly held definition of ideblogy is profoundly

vague.

Once again, WebsterVs New Lexicon secondarily refers

to ideology as "the way of thinking of a class, culture or
individual", and this seems to be the commonly accepted
definition of the word.-

The primary definition, however,

is "a body of ideas used in support of an economic,

political or social theory [italics added]

The difference

between the two definitions, in fact, highlights the central
issues involving theocratic power.

The more common,

secondary definition suggests that ideology is a separate

■

phenomenon contingent only upon the whims of aggregate

groups.

The primary, or more accurate, definition ties

ideology to the implementation of specific"economic,
political or social" agendas.

Ideologies, then, are

responses to real issues and not the residual consequence of
human passion.

Religion, as an ideology, can be said to

possess a practical dimension that eschews fanaticism, but
will avail itself of demagogy when impending crises preclude

satisfactory explanations.
The Institute for Propaganda Analysis has defined

propaganda as "The expression of opinions or actions carried
out deliberately by individuals or groups with a view to
influencing the opinions or actions of other individuals or

groups for predetermined ends and through psychological
manipulations."^

The "predetermined ends" of theocratic

government differ little from those of other states:

political stability, economic viability and territorial
integrity.

In each chapter, I attempted to define terms specific
to the topic discussed.

For example, in the chapter dealing

with Islamic holy war (which is an institutional and

political reality), I was mindful of the distinguishing
characteristics of jihad as a religious concept that

actually mitigated against its inclusion as a holy war

theory at all.

Initially, it was enough to have working

definitions of the main ideas central to this thesis,

namely: theocracy, ideology, and propaganda.

It is hoped

that through the process of academic discussion concerning
this topic, a consensus may be achieved for a clear
definition of holy war, unhindered by the biases of the
past.

For purposes of clarity I chose to utilize the term

"Middle East" to describe the geographic location of

•

Mesopatamia, Arabia, Egypt, and the Levant.

The term

"southwest asia" seems vague and non-specific.
In order to emphasize the connection between

theocracies and holy war concepts, I arbitrarily chose to•

end discussion of its development at specific intervals in
Judaic, Christian and Islamic history.

For obvious reasons

(chiefly, the absence of an Israelite kingdom- after the
Jewish diaspora of the first century B.C.E.), the topic of
Judaic holy war can be seriously entertained only up until

the period of Roman occupation in Palestine (and Certainly
no further than the Bar Kokhba; rebellion of.132-135 G.E.).

In the case of Christianity, I regarded the Crusades as the
.quintessential expression of ^.Christian holy war, and so 1

stopped there,

pne could argue that the religious wars of

Europe possessed an element of religious sanction, but if .
they did, the extent of that sanction certainly paled,in

comparison to that of the medieval Crusades.

In many ways,

the warring constituencies of the Reformation and Counter-

Reformation represented social movements that derived their
holy war mentality and religious ideology from the

theocratic kings and popes of the Middle Ages.

Similarly, I

assigned'the period of Ottoman hegemony to; represent the
apex of Islamic holy war concepts in the east.

Originally, it was my intent to: discuss modern

-
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extremist groups and their utilization of holy war as an

ideological instrument.

In fact, all the requisite elements

of the historical period apply to the modern era.
■

'

■

■

Zionism

.

began as a socio-political movement, utilizing holy war
themes that had remained dormant since the Jewish Diaspora.

These themes were easily transferrable to the establishment
of the Israeli state, which, in many respects, resembles a

modern theocracy.

Similarly, many modern Christian and

Islamic political movements have expropriated holy war
themes in pursuit of their immediate agendas simply because
concepts of holy war have been accepted socially and

culturally in their respective religious traditions for
centuries.

If the socio-political conditions that

precipitated the advent of these modern extremist groups
were adequately analyzed, they would confirm the basic
contention of my thesis: that governments or groups, in the
absence of an alternative ideology, will avail themselves of

the cohesive properties of religion in response to specific
social or political crises.

Unfortunately, due to the

length and breadth of the historical period, and given the
restrictions governing the size of this thesis project,. I
relegated discussion of the modern era to future research.

A Survey of the Literature

Primary Sources;

To a certain extent, I regarded Judaic, Christian, and

Islamic Holy Scriptures as valuable first-hand accounts;
throughout my research, I used reliable translations for
these and other primary sources.

Both the New Testament and

the Qur'an were produced rather early on in the development

of their respective faiths.

Hebrew worship of YHWH, on the

other hand, preceded the formulation of Scripture by nearly

seven hundred years.

Therefore, I found it necessary to

distinguish Judaic perceptions of history from that which

could be independently verified through the modern social
sciences, especially given the paucity of contemporaneous
corroborative sources and the ever increasing importance of

archaeological contributions to the study of ancient Judaic
culture.

With respect to the scriptural literature of each

faith, I attempted to use a several translations for
semantic reasons.

For example, when discussing Tanak (or

Old Testament) literature, I relied on both the definitive
Masoretic text and,the Peshitta (Aramaic) version.

I did

this for comparative reasons, the LXX (Septuagint)

tra.nslation being excluded for its questionable reliability

in the exuGial area of ancient e|3ic po^^^

For Qur'anic

citations I relied on Pickthall's translation, although I

augmented his work with other selections, including Dawood's
(whose work I consider to be inferior) in an attempt to

indicate the problems that have plagued Qur'anic studies in
the west.

Early Christian sources include Tertullian, Ignatius
of Antioch, St. Justin Martyr, Hippolytus, St. Vincent of

Lerin, Orusius, Sculpius Severus, St. Augustine, Eusebius
and Leo the Great.

Most of these sources I found translated

in edited compilations by Anne Fremantle (A Treasury of

Early Christianity).. Edwin A. Quain (The Fathers of the
Church), Philip Schaff (The Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers
of the Christian Church). or Jean Comby (How to Read Church

History).

The complete works I cited for early Christianity

were Eusebius' History of the Church and St. Augustine^s
City of God (upon which I relied extensively).

An excellent

primary Medieval source, one which illustrates the extent to
which Charlemagne was committed to St. Augustine's ideal,
can be found in Einhard^ s Life of Charlemagne, included in

Two Lives of Charlemagne (Lewis Thorpe, translator). , Other
primary sources for the Medieval period have been collected

and edited by scholars such as Brian Tierney (The Middle

Ages. Sources of Medieval History) and Patrick Geary

10

(Readings in Medieval Histonyi";

A veritable wealth of holy

war rhetoric may be gleaned from the letters of Gregory VII.
These have been translated by Ephraim Emerton in a
collection entitled The Correspondence of Pope Gregory VII.
I found several first hand accounts of the Crusades in the

memoirs of Raymond IV (Count of Toulouse) and Geoffrey of
Villehardouin to be helpful as background information,
although I did not rely upon them for content; a slightly
less contemporary account is that of Joinville's.

Primary Islamic sources, at least those translations

interpretive of jihad, are expressed in the body of Hadith
literature bequeathed to the Muslim communities throughout
the world.

These sources rely almost exclusively on the

value of interpretation of ideas and are to be distinguished
from historical sources that are more relevant to the

process by which holy war became an accepted institutional

response in Islam.

Hadith is likely to stress the "proper"

:interpretation of jihad as a concept of personal struggle
against sin and a political struggle for the independence of
the Islamic community.

Because it is couched in such

hyperbole, however, it appears to preach war.

For the

purposes of this project, I deferred to sources utilizing
the definitive interpretations of al-Bukhari.

Contemporary

Arab accounts of the Crusades, although I did not consider

11

them entirely relevant to the specific topic, abound in Amin
Maalouf s The Crusades Through Arab Eyes and Francesco
Gabrieli's Arab Historians Of the Crusades♦

Secondary

Because the topic of ancient Israelite history is
dependent on scriptural considerations, it was necessary to

spend some time evaluating interpretive sources.

In this

regard, I normally deferred to the expertise of established
Biblical scholarship.

I did, on occasion, disagree with the

consensus on some issues; however, in the body of the paper

I emphasized whose scholarship I consider authoritative.

;

The scholarship I consulted included Moshe Weinfeld
(Deuteronomv and the Deuteronomic School) . Julius Bewer
Literature of

(The

the 01d Testament) . Richard Elliott Friedman

(Who Wrote the Bible?) .
and Robert Polzin

James D. Martin

(The Book of

(Moses and the Deuteronomist) .

Judges)

Several

edited volumes containing the works of J.M. Miller

("Israelite History") '', Peter Ackroyd ("The Historical

Literature")^, Keith Whitelam ("The Former Prophets")® and A.

Graeme Auld ("Prophecy and the Prophets") ' were used

For the vast majority of the material that became, in
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effect, a structural model in ancient Israelite history for

this work, I consulted six texts.

Among these, perhaps the

most valuable were Paul Johnson's Historv of the Jews, the

admirable (if somewhat controversial) archaelogical analysis

of William Stiebing's Out of the Desert?. and the concise
yet surprisingly complete information obtained from the
Dictionary of Bible and Religion, edited by William H,

Gentz.

A seminal work by Barnabas Lindars entitled Judges

1-5, A New Translation and Commentary provided me with the

most current research concerning the Deuteronomic authorship
of "Judges" and was absolutely central to my contention that
holy war themes in Israelite history appeared for the first
time in the early monarchic period.

Several other works,

such as Susan Niditch's War in the Hebrew Bible and T.R.

Hobbs' A Time for War; A Study of Warfare in the Old

Testament, effectively dealt with the general theme of
Judaic warfare.

Journal articles on the topic of Judaic

holy war that I utilized were: Reuven Firestone's

"Conceptions of Holy War in Biblical and Qur'anic Tradition"
(Journal of Religious Ethics. Spr. *96, 24:99-123) and
Michael Walzer's "The Idea of Holy War in Ancient Israel"
(Journal of Religious Ethics. Fall*92, 20:215-235).

Given the tendency of western historians to categorize

Christian concepts of war within the Augustinian "just war"

13

model, I had to re-interpret much of the existing historical
literature.

I do not think that secularism has been

uncritical of Christian warfare; I simply believe that for
cultural reasons western warfare has been favorably

contrasted to that of the Islamic east.

Thus, "just war"

has been viewed as a Christian concept,"holy war" as an
Islamic feature,®
rule.

There are, however, exceptions to this

Several Scholars, including Runciman and Armstrong.,

have effectively challenged this notion (unfortunately, they
do not apply an operational definition of holy war in the
process).

As will be seen, I attempt to prove a

definitional model of Christian holy war based on
Augustine's works.

The most noteworthy attempt to define Christian

concepts of war, to date, is that of John Kelsay and James
Turner Johnson, who effectively draw appropriate parallels
between Christian just war and Islamic holy war and explain

their expropriation by modern political ideologies.®

This

explains their reliance on variant sunni and shi'i
traditions involving theories of war; it is essential to a
modern understanding of holy war, given the advent of

Islamic revival and the impact of the Iranian revolution on
extremist movements.^®

I, on the other hand, have sought to

establish the religious ideological roots from which holy

14

war theories emerged, not the modern political ideologies

that expropriate thei^ (althou^

I entirely agree with Kelsay

and Johnson that religioh and political ideology ate
complimentary of one another).

Kelsay and Johnson have also

worked hard to establish a Christian theoretical model of

just war

In this regard, however, I believe that Augustine ;

articulated two separate and distinct theories of war: the

just war and the holy war."

Established texts of Medieval

ecclesiastical history include Henry Chadwick's The Earlv
Church. Thomas Bokenkotter's A Concise History of the
Catholic Church. Arnold Harris Matthew's The Life and Times

of Hildebrand and a multi-volumed work entitled The History

of the Christian Church, edited by Anselm Biggs.

Because the idea of holy war as an ideology became the

primary focus for this thesis project, the particulars of
crusading warfare were of little interest.

What mattered

was the agenda of the theocratic leaders of the Crusades,
i.e., kings and popes.

Histories tracing the evolution of

the crusading ideal were of particular importance in this
regard.

Aside from consulting Runciman, whose multi-volumed

work represents the authoritative text on the Crusades, I

also utilized Jonathan Riley-Smith's The First Crusade and
the Idea of Crusading. Carl Erdman^ s The Origin of the Idea
of Crusade and Ronald C. vFinucane's Soldiers of the Faith.

15

Upon undertaking the necessary research for the chapter

on Isiaiti/: I was cognizant of the fact that Very few, if any,
western sources have treated the Islamic concept of jihad

with the objectivity it deserves.

Works such as Dilip

Hiro's Holy Wars. The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism, and
ri.H. Hansen^ s Militant Islam, although they provided some

valuable basic history, tended to perpetuate the western

stereotype of Islam as a militant faith.

Other sources,

such as Hazrat Mizra Tahir Ahmad's Murder in the Name of

Allah provided balance, however, and articulated the notion
that, among the three monotheistic traditions, theoretical
Islam imposed a greater number of restrictions on the

ability to wage war than either Judaism or Christianity.
The research of Ralph Salmi, Cesar Adib, and George K.

;

Tanham (Islam and Conf1let Resolution, Theories and

Practices) Served as valuable background information.
Seminal research into the period of early Islamic

conquest has been conducted by John W. Jandora (The March
From Medina: A Revisionist Study of the Arab Conquests) and
Fred McGraw Donner (The Early Islamic Conquests). for

purposes of this paper, I relied on Donner's work.

. : .; ,

For

Qur'anic exegesis and interpretation, I consulted John '
Burton^s The Collection of the Durban, Kenneth Craaa^s The

Event of the Our^an. and Helmut Gatje's The Our^an and its

16

Exegesis.

I utilized the historical inforniation con

in al-Tabari's histories, translated by Philip Fields, the
excellent work of Elias Shoufani (Al-Riddah and the Muslim

Conquest of Arabia), The Cambridge History of Islam edited

by Holt, Lambton and Lewis, R. Stephen Humphreys^ Islamic
History: A Framework for Inquiry. Sydney Nettleton^M
and

i11iaiti Oschenwaldt s The Middle East: A. History. Albert

Hoiirani^ s A History of the Arab Peoples, Arthur
Goldschmidt's A Concise History of the Middle East, M. Fuad

Korpulu's The origins of the Ottoman Empire, and Ira
Lapidus' A History of Islamic Societies.

I relied upon

these historical texts extensively.

:

Utilizing these sources, it was possible to adequately

investigate the sources of holy war theory in monotheistic
tradition.

It • does;seem interesting that religious ideology

operates so well within the framework of a monotheistic
culture.

Perhaps this is due to the fact that central

theocratic governments,are enhanced by development of the
notion that one god, supreme and all-powerful, ■rules the

physical environment of humanity.

To be sure, the ancient

Egyptians had advanced the idea that their rulers were semi-,
divine within the context of a polytheistic society. ■; In
fact, it would be difficult not to regard theirs as a

theocratic state.

•

The sheer multiplicity of gods, however.
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made it tiaxd to mandate a national will as local dieties

were arguably symbolic representatives of various Egyptian
sub-regions and their particular political agendas.

Until

Akhenaten's attempt to unify the two kingdoms under one god,
there had been no effort to exercise the influence of one

constituency over the other in ancient Egypt.

Once the

ascendancy of a particular constituency was achieved, a

single, directed effort at creating a "national" unity
became possible.

Despite the polytheism of Mesopotamia,

various sky gods achieved dominance in Sumerian, Akkadian,
Assyrian, and Babylonian pantheons, each exercising a

particular influence on their respective communities' will
to wage war.

The success of these "dominant gods" and their

intimate relationship to the state and its leaders served as
a model for ancient Middle-Eastern societies in pursuit of
cultural and political cohesion.

In the region of Canaan, a

small ethnic community, centered on the growing influence of
one of these militant gods, effectively united the concepts
of divine will and nationhood and defined (perhaps for the
first time) the relevancy of holy war.

While Western historians have adequately explained the
rational expropriation of religious themes for purposes of

war in ancient polytheistic societies, they remain obstinant
in their unwillingness to discuss the same process occurring
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in the monotheistic tradition.

Monotheism has seemingly

cornered the market on fanaticism.

It is the purpose of

this thesis project to address this misunderstanding.
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CHAPTER ONE: JUDAIC NATIONALISM

The eventual success of YHWH in achieving singular

devotion among the Israelite tribes developed slowly and
methodically.

At first, the ancient Jews entertained a

pantheon of gods similar to that of various Semitic peoples^
inhabiting the Arabian, Mesopotamian, and Canaanite regions.;
Gradually, the notion that one God held sway over all
creation cook hold and flourished in the nomadic environment

of early Israelite culture.

In a similar fashion, both

Judaic history and Jewish religious ideology developed over

time.

This chapter will critically analyze the sources of

Judaic history in an attempt to piece together the process
by which holy war gained political, social, and scriptural

approval.

It will be demonstrated that religious ideology

emerged during specific periods of social and political
crisis in the Israelite community, most notably in the

monarchic period, occasionally re-emerging as an effective
tool of political opposition in the world of Hellenistic

imperialism.

Crucial to this task is the subjection of

Biblical sources to the rigors of textual analysis.
Western scholarship has inherited a rich and venerable

tradition of textual analysis and criticism from the
humanists of the Renaissance period.
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Since Lorenzo Valla's

exposure of Constantine's "Donatio" as a forgery, efforts
have been made to regard religious and ecclesiastical

literature with some measure of objectivity

Even the Bible

has come to be seen as a historical source of arguable ;

integrity; reliant, to a certain extent, on whatever

corroboration may be achieved through the application of
modern social sciences.

That is not to say that Biblical historicism is not
without its defenders; indeed, in recent years there has

emerged a "revival" of scriptural literalism that has helped
to invigorate the Christian apologetic movement.

Still, if

the Bible's champions demand that it be treated as serious,
history, then it should be subjected to all the tests that a
true historical document requires.

Surprisingly, there are

those who still attempt to date the exodus based upon the

eruption of Thera, simply because this catastrophic event
helps to explain the parting of the Red Sea; an event we

accept as history only because the Bible mentions it.
Scholarship, however, demands more than a faithful

acceptance of time-honored geneologies and mythic events in
order to render a reasonable verdict concerning the accuracy
of the historical record contained in the Bible.

With a

prudent and discriminating use of external sources and
internal textual analysis, however, one may reliably piece

together the essential elements of ancient Judaic history.
For the present moment, it will be sufficient to

compare what we know about the ancient Judaic period from
Biblical sources with the contemporary historical record and

the discoveries made available through the archaeological
sciences.

The Bible indicates twelve main periods preceding

the Diaspora that are relevant to my research:

(1) The Patriarchal Age
(2) Slavery (in Egypt)
(3) Exodus

(4) Conquest of Canaan

(5) Judges (Confederation of Tribes)
(6) Monarchy
(A) United
(B) Divided

(7) Earlier Prophets
(8) Assyrian Conquest
(9) Babyloniau Exile
(10) Return to Palestine

(11) Seleucid Domination
(12) Roman Occupation

This outline serves as both an aid and a critical tool with

which to compare the information extrapolated by historians

and textual critics concerning the socio-political
environments of the ancient Judaic state with the stated

Biblical interpretation of history.

In the attempt to

reconstruct (Fudaic history and the scriptural acceptance of

a holy war ideology, it seems reasonable to begin with the
conquest of Canaan.
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Gonquest of Canaan {1258'-122d B.C.E.)

The discussion of events surrounding the supposed

conquest of Gannan by the Israelites is crucial, for it was
precisely during this period that Moses was credited with

perhaps the first expressipn of the Judaic holy war ethic in
Biblical tradition.'^-

If the conquest narratives cannot be

trusted as historical, however, it is clear that the idea of

Judaic holy war must be re-assigned to a later period in
Judaic history.

;

;

According to the Biblical account, the Israelites
wandered for forty years in the wilderness surrounding the
area of Kadesh-Barnea, before entering Canaan (Num.20:14).

From there they launched an invasion of Canaanite territory,
that traversed the regions of the Negeb and either skirted

or passed through Edom, in an attempt to conquer the cities
of the north.

Specific mention is made of locations such

as Beer-sheba and Hormah, in the Negeb, as urban centers

contemporaneous with this invasion by the Bible.

The

kingdoms and/or cities of Trans-Jordan listed are: Moab,
Edom, Punon, Oboth, Dibon, Jericho and Ai
There are immediate problems in ascribing historical
accuracy to the conquest narratives of the Old Testament.

According the "terminus ante quem" provided to us by the
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Merneptah stele, the Israelite exodus may be dated to the

period preceding the reign of its author (1224-1214
B.C.E.) ,^"'

Biblical geneologies, used by literalists as a

dating method for the exodus, are absolutely unreliable

given the exaggerated life spans of the central characters.
Thus, we are left with the compelling evidence of Ex.1:11
(corroborated with archaeological data) that places the
Israelite captivity within the reign of Ramses II, just

before that of Merneptah.^®

Recent attempts to redate the

exodus to the fifteenth century B.C.E. have been largely

unsuccessful."

We can be reasonably assured, therefore,

that if the exodus occurred at all, it took place some time

'in the thirteenth century B.C.E.

According to traditional

dating methods, this means that any invasion of Canaanite
lands must have occurred during the Late Bronze Age (1500

1200 B.C.E).

Unfortunately, the archaeological record

confirms nothing of the sort.

Interestingly, the absence of identifiable artifacts
indicates that there were no Late Bronze Age settlements,

either in the Negeb, corresponding to the supposed locations
of Beer-sheba and Hormah, or in Trans-Jordan, in the areas

of Hesbon, Aroer, Punon, Oboth, Dibon, Jericho or Ai.^°
This problem has led some to question the archaeological
dating system that places the end of the Middle Bronze Age
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shortly before the fifteenth century B.C.E.

Correspondingly, such critics as John Bimson theorize that

this allows for a iauch earlier exodus, which would

potentially explain the absence of Late Bronze Age artifacts
at specific locations traditionally associated with the
conquest

In actuality/ Bimson's theory poses more

problems than it pretends to solve.

For one thing, it

places the period of conquest and Hebrew Judges concurrent
with a well documented Egyptian presence in Canaan.

The

fourteenth century Amarna tablets' reference to "Hapiru"
insurrections are only tenuously connected to the Israelite

community, due to the probability that the term was
descriptive of social status rather than ethnicity.
Seemingly, we are presented with a historical paradox: a
thirteenth century invasion of Cahaan for which there is no

corroborative archaeological eyldence.

This problem has

resulted in a number of attempts to construct alternative

"models" for the Israelite occupation of Cahaan.

Among

these are the: (1)Settlement and (2)Internal-Revolt

hypotheses.

The Internal-Revolt model depends almost

exclusively on social theory and has been regarded as

suspect.

For purposes of this thesis project, the

Settlement model was used, because it allows for some

moderation.

Regardless of the method of occupation, it is
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clear, the Israelites settled in Canaan.

A reasonable

assumption, given the absence of evidence for wholesale
destruction, is that they probably migrated there in small
numbers some time in the thirteenth century B,C.E.

Despite

this, the fact remains that if the Biblical record cannot be
trusted as a reliable historical source, then we may assume

that the "conquest" of Canaan represents nothing less than
an invention of later authors intended as an explanation of

the Israelite presence there.

The holy war themes expressed

in conquest stories, therefore, may also be seen as

subsequent additions.

There is concrete evidence that they

were inserted into the books of Joshua and Judges by an

author of the monarchic period.

The Period of Judges (1200-1000 B.C.E.)

The evidence suggests that by the twelfth and eleventh
centuries B.C.E. an Israelite community existed within the

territorial boundaries of Canaan.

During this period, a

loose confederation of tribes ruled by charismatic "judges",

or military chieftans, fought occasional battles with the
surrounding ethnic groups indegenous to the region. In no
sense could this confederation have been construed as a

mechanism for a unified response to the external crises of
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the periqdV^®( ■

:

fact, that the tribes under ;

f the Authority of the judgee^^^r^

^

only defensively to the

various threats to Israelite security, and not aggressively
as some have thought.^®
It was at this time, the scholarly consensus maintains,

that the oldest Judaic war hymn, the"Song of Deborah", was

'composed

This poem;exemplifies the very es

ancient Israelite holy war mentality.

of

The practice of

consulting with God before battle is clearly demonstrated in
the actions of Deborah, and the language of Judges 6:13 and
6:31 hints of God's endorsement of war

If these themes

are accurate indications of Israelite culture in the :

confederacy period, then, it must be surmised, a holy war
mentality preceded the monarchy by at least two hundred

years. \

^ ■ ''./'.'l'"'N '

'>

There are problems, however, with the credibility of
the consensus on this issue.

Many of the scholars who

, :champion the antiquity and accuracy of this poem actually
,

take a literalist approach in their methodology.

■

A

considerable lack of attention is paid to the historical
./ consensus, in this regard.

For example, there is

considerable evidence that the practice of divine
consultation before battle was an ancient and venerable

Middle-Eastern tradition designed to invoke God's
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protection, not his approval, in war.^®

This practice had

arguably become a ritual observance devoid of any profound
significance for the Israelite community.

Recent research

has tended to throw doubt on the supposed antiquity of the

poem in question, as well.

It would not be an overstatement

to conclude that the "unanimous" consensus on the issue has

been effectively shattered.

A comprehensive study of

"Deborah's Song" was completed in 1995 by Barnabas Lindars.
This seminal work represents the current scholarly research

concerning the pre-monarchic period of Judaic literature and

may form the basis for a new consensus.

Lindars'

position, based on an almost line-by-line assessment of
"Deborah's Song", is that the poem was probably composed
sometime during the early monarchy and is singularly out of
place in the period of judges.

The Monarchic Period (1020-597 B.C.E.)

In discussing the Israelite monarchy, one must be
cognizant of the various stages through which it passed.
For example, upon examining the early monarchy, a serious

scholar should not expect to find mature, fully formed
expressions of the holy war ethic.
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Instead, scholarly

analysis jiiight detect indieations of an emerging agenda ttat
necessitated such expressions.

Realistically, it would be

naive to classify the early period as part of the united
monarchy at all, given the hesitancy with which many sectors
of the Israelite community surrendered autonomy.

Only after

the considerable military successes of David could it be

truly said that the Israelite kingdom was, in any sense,
united geographically.

If we are to impute some credibilty to the research of

Lindars (and others who comprise the new consensus), then it
would be reasonable to expect that holy war themes like
those expressed in the book of Judges were the product of a
later author,

Arguably, this author operated sometime in

the monarchic period.

As will be demonstrated, oral

history, Yahwistic, Elohistic, and Deuteronomic literary
composition converged in the monarchic period to produce a
:Judaic model for holy war.

The periods assigned to each of

these literary•traditions are as follows: early monarchy
(oral histories), united monarchy (Yahwistic sources) and

divided monarchy (Elohistic and Deuteronomic sources).
would be the task of the Deuteronomic historian(s) to

essentially reconstruct Judaic history in the books of
Deuteronomy, ,Joshua, Judges, 1 and II Kings, I and II :
Chronicles, and Samuel.
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It
.

As previously noted/ the reign of Saul can be placed in

the period of the early mdnarchy, even though he did
nominally rule over a unified kingdom.

Until David's

successful Campaign against the Philistines/ the Israelite
kingdom would remain geographically small.

David's

;

reign(lOdd-961 B.C.E.) does/ in fact, straddle the periods:

of early and united monarchy; and although:he began the
trend of centralization typical of the united monarchy, the

period of true unification belongs to Solomon's reign (961
922 B.C.E.)/ when state-implemented policies and the

nationalistic ideology of religion complimented each other.

That is not to say that the task of creating a unified

ideology was completed under Solomon; in fact, precisely
because there were no external crises during this period,
the issue remained relatively dormant.

It would not be

until the catastrophic Assyrian invasions of the seventh

century B.C.E. that the dire necessity for a nationalism
would emerge, producing the work of the Deuteronomic school
of history (it was during the reign of Josiah that a

fragment of the Deuteronomic law code was "discovered" in
the Jerusalem temple)
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The Early Monarchy {1020-1000 B.CiE.)

The initial causes that produced the institution of the

monarchy and resulted, almost four hundred years later, in
the extreme nationalism of Josiah's reign could be found at

the end of the period of judges.

The confederation found it

increasingly difficult to survive the highly competitive
environment of the ancient Middle-East as the Israelite

tribes had many adversaries with which to contend for
resources.-^

A decisive moment had arrived in Israelite

history.'The need for a strong, unified government that
could foster and protect a cultural identity, and thereby
insure the survival of the Israelite community, now worked

to produce the institution of the monarchy.

In addition,

this monarchy would marry the secular perogatives of

military defense and economic policy with the unique
attributes of religious authority.

In short, Israel

developed as a theocracy.

Initially, this fledgling monarchy suffered under the
inconsistent leadership of Saul, who fought tirelessly

against the external threats to Israel but offended the

general population with his volatile personality.^'

The

Israelites had been hesitant to hand over such authority to

a single individual; the very notion seemed to violate their
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sense of independence and autonomy.

This wariness of

central authority was typical of the prophetic community.
The prophets, who had wielded considerable charismatic power
in the early Israelite communities, feared an erosion of

their power base, once the king was appointed.

The popular

cry for political cohesion was too insistent, however, and
the prophet Samuel relented, placing Saul on the throne of
Israel.

Although he blessed the new king, Samuel performed

the ritual with a warning:

"This will be the manner of the king
that shall,reign over you: he will
take your sons and appoint them unto
him...and he will take your daughters
to be performers and to be cooks and
to be bakers. And he will take your
fields, and your vineyards, and your
olive yards, even the best of them
to his servants...He will take a tenth

of your flocks and ye shall be his
servants.

These words were especially meaningful to the tribal leaders
who, for their own reasons, resented any circumvention of

their independent political status.

As the power of this

monarchy grew, eclipsing the influence of both prophet and
patriarch, so did rural opposition to the policies of

centralized government.®®

The task facing the monarchy was

to effectively counter these rural concerns with an appeal
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to a greater concept: namely, the notion of Israel as a

nation under the protection of Yahweh.

It is no accident of

history that in the subsequent environment of the united

monarchy

the "Song of Deborah", with its nationalistic

themes, was most probably composed.

As the need for political centralization and
militarization increased, there emerged a genre of

propaganda that expropriated traditional devices (Judaic
verse) in an attempt to construct a national polity, based
on the unitive properties of religious culture.

At first, :

it comprised only an awkward attempt to place nationalistic
motifs in the chaotic years of confederacy.

As the

integrity of this propaganda developed, Yahweh became the
symbol of divine leadership and would be increasingly
perceived as the agent who shared His salvific properties
with the King.

It was, arguably, in the time of David's ;

reign (certainly by the end of Solomon's) that another

nationalistic poem, "The Song of the Sea" would find its way
into the Israelite vocabulary.

"The Song of the Sea" was a

significant piece of Judaic verse, most notably for its

reference (the first one of its kind in history) to Yahweh

33

as a God of war, who protected and nurtured the Israelite

community.^"

Although Biblical "purists" argue that ample

evidence exists elsewhere in scripture for a God of

retribution, it becomes essential to deteremine when these

specific elements of Scripture were developed, either
verbally or in their final written form.
Biblical narrative is largely the product of four
interwoven sources: The J (Yahwist,10-9th centuries B.C.E.),

■ . E (Elohist,9-8th centuries B.C.E.), D (Deuteronomist,8-7th
centuries B.C.E.), and P (Priestly,6th century B.C.E.)

schools of literary tradition.'"

The Bible, therefore,

cannot be read as a chronological document due to the

y ideological and social agendas that obtained at the various
times of composition, requiring the creation of history (as
oral verse and written prose) long after the events it
describes occurred.

Thus, although the Exodus most probably

took place in the thirteenth century B.C and was rendered

verbally into the collective Israelite consciousness, it was
not until the tenth and ninth centuries that specific

■ elements of that story, contained in such poems as "The Song
of the Sea", were recorded in written form by the Yahwist

source."

Additionally, much of scripture did not appear in

,its final written form unti1 after the influence of the

; Priestly source who, operating, in exilic times, edited and
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redacted the poems, folk-tales; and fragmentary accounts
that eventually comprised the Pentateuch.
The initial task of the scriptural scholar, then, is to
determine which books of the Bible were more heavily

influenced by one school or another, and when they were
written.

The following table depicts the current consensus

concerning Biblical authorship relevant to this thesis
project''^:

Genesis

J, E, p

Exodus

J, E, D, P

: Pv'

Leviticus

'

Numbers

Deuteronomy

E, D

Joshua

D

Judges

■ D

I Samuel

■

D ■

■,

II Samuel

D

Note the prominence of the Deuteronomic historian in the
creation of early texts, particularly those whose subject
matter pertains to the conquest narratives (Deuteronomy,

Joshua, Judges and I and II Samuel) .

The socio-political

agenda of this Deuteronomic historian(s) will be

subsequently discussed at length in an analysis of the
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divided monarchy.

The table also helps to illustrate that the J, or

Yahwist/ literary tradition was instrumental in the early
construction of exodus texts, at precisely the same time

that nationalistic poems such as "The Song of Deborah" and
"The Song of the Sea" (in their pristine oral renditions)
were emerging as monarchical propaganda for centralization.
This represents nothing less than "polemic history", in
which the alienation of indigenous cultures was achieved
through the sanction of holy war.

In their scholarly

analysis of the Yahwist source, David Rosenberg and Harold
Bloom have observed that the self-defined "jealousy" of the
Israelite God reflects, in essence, the "zeal ofthe divine

warrior."''^

Additionally, Rosenberg and Bloom have found

that the exodus represented, for the Yahwist author, not a

liberation from bondage so much as the beginning of a "new
exile" (forty years of wandering and the uncertainty of the
confederation period).

The Yahwist author, then, probably

regarded the establishment of an Israelite kingdom as a type

of political and social renewal for the community.

In this

context, even the prohibition of images was an expression of
Yahweh's "dynamism", a dimension that contributed to the

Davidic notion that "everything that matters is perpetually

new."^®

The two nationalistic poems of the period were

expressions of this renewal in which a new nationalism,
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centered on faith in Yahweh and his representative the King,

was emerging.

This process would come to fruition during

the reign of Solomon, when the Yahwist author refined and

institutionalized the concept of theocracy in scripture.^''

The United Monarchy (1000-922 B.C.E.)

-

What did this "renewal" of Israelite culture entail?

•

For one thing, it'resulted in the establishment of political
and religious authority in Jerusalem.

The relocation of the

Ark of the Covenant there by David set the stage for

portentious political and religious reforms that would .
further sabotage the autonomy of rural constituencies.

Significantly, it was David who finally subdued the

V;

Philistine armies, utilizing, no doubt, the impressive
"warrior zeal" the Yahwist author had toiled so tirelessly
to produce.

Given the reasons for centralization, the

emphasis on "renewal" in this period, and the developing
progandastic tools utilized to pursue nationalistic goals, a

national ideology now began to emerge.

In this regard, the

"blessings of Yahweh" on the nation entailed nothing less

than Ellul's "predetermined ends" of government: political
stability, economic prosperity, and territorial integrity.
■

As the military stature of Israel improved, political
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and religious reforms were pursued vigordusly.

Under

Solomon, the institution of the monarchy became synonimous
with religious authority and the temple in Jerusalem emerged

as the effective royal, dynastic chapel of the the King.^®
The course pursued by Solomon provoked considerable
opposition to his policies, expectedly from those
traditional pockets Of disaffected constituencies that
continued to suffer from diminished status: tribal

leadership and the prophetic schools♦

Although prophetic

opposition to state policies dared not raise its voice too
loudly in the Solomonic period, an anti-monarchic sentiment,

born of dissatisfaction with the corvee began to emerge^
This political feeling would express itself in subsequent

movements as a loyal Yahwistic critique of royal

"orientalism" .1'°

Just as the pro-monarchic Yahwistic

authors of scriptural tradition were helping to create a

religious propaganda for the state, prophetic social
movements were beginning to incorporate holy war motifs into
their own agendas.

It was the specific intent of the

Yahwistic author, who reinterpreted the period of exodus and

conquest in nationalistic vand theocratic terms, to de

legitimize the opposition both with "historical" proofs and
theological statements based,on Scripture.
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The Piyided Monarchy (922-597 B.C.E.)

When the sbcial tensions of unification became too much

for the disparate tribes to bear, the kingdom ruptured in
922 B..C.E, ieaving Jeroboam in the north to rule over the

larger -kingdom of;Israel and Rehoboam ih the south to

administer Jud^h,

Throughout the period of divided

monarchy, the northern and southern kingdoms continued the
process of centralization but.with varying reactions from
their respective opposition movements.
In a way, the northern kingdom contained the seeds of
its own, destruction.

It had been the northern rural tribes,

suffering under the yoke of forced labor in the south/ that
had rebelled against Jerusalem.

The most virulent anti-

government forces, then, were concentrated in the kingdom of
Israel.

In an attempt to subvert any invasion plans from

the south, however, Israel embarked on the same

/

centralization policies that had proven to be the downfall

of the unified kingdom.

Within fifty years of its

inception, the Israelite kingdom, led by the powerful Omri

dynasty, located its religious and political authority in
the urban centers of Bethel and Samaria.

This resulted in

a great chasm between the cities and the rural poor that

might have provoked tribal opposition were it not for the
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state's acGomociation of local cultic traditions and

practices.

To a certain extent, the royal patronage of

indigenous Baal cults and the erection of the golden calf at
Bethel mollified local opposition to royal policies.
Unfortunately, these attempts at synchrotism only angered
the prophetic community, which now positioned itself as
God's scourge on the monarchy.

Increasingly, the prophets of Israel had witnessed the
erosion of their political and moral authority in society.
Now, they could only.watch as in the north they were

replaced with "court prophets", who were nothing more than

royal sycophants

Such men comforted the apostate Ahab in

his campaigns against Ben-Hadad (Kings 20:13).-^

This

obvious circumvention of proper authority, offended the sense
of moral conscience and orthodoxy of the prophets.

In the

north,' their outrage would vent itself in aggressive, anti

moharchical: outbursts tinged with the moral imperatives of
holy war.'^"^

'

In Judah, to the south, criticism was much less harsh,

partly because the most violent opposition to monarchy had
always been in the north, but also, because the southern
kingdom was much smaller and the burden of administration

was less severe.^''

Additionally, Judaean Kings like

Jehosopbat (873-840 B.C.E.)/ rather than capitulate to local
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:

politics by assimilating indigenous Canaanite culture, chose
to utilize the religious community of Jerusalem to enforce

cultural unity throughout the rural areas of Judah.^®

This

did not always work, however, and occasionally the need
arose to repair the damage done by someone like Athalia

(Ahab's sister), who had attempted to "Canaanize" Judah.^^
Interestingly, the first of the great southern prophets,
Isaiah, began chastizing King Uzziah for his apostasy
directly after the destructive influence of Athaliah's
reign.

Still, the southern prophets always ended their

discourses with messianic references, promising the future

glory of Judah under the restoration of the Davidic line.^®
This stood apart from the gloomy themes expressed by critics
of the northern kingdom, as. exemplified in the discourses of
Amos and Hosea.

Perhaps sensing the tenuous existence of

Israel, which found itself assailed by prophets and menaced
by emerging Aramaean and Assyrian hegemony, the Elohist

author emerged.

The Elohist attempted, in ways startlingly

similar to the Yahwist of the United Monarchy, to craft a

northern nationalism.^®

Although it ultimately failed in

convincing the north to unite, the Elohistic literature
would become another of the great "schools" on which later

scripture based its authority.
Sufficient diversity among the Judaean tribes, coupled
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with the mild, yet persistent, prophetic criticism of Isaiah

and the heterodoxy of the north, produced a need for a
southern rearticulation of the Yahwistic nationalism so

recently abandonded.

Indeed, the climate had become almost

desperate after the fall of Israel to the armies of Assyria
in 720 B.C.E., a blow that shook the Judaean kingdom to its

very core.®°

The combined forces of state and religious

authority, in the south, had to somehow reproduce a sense of
cultural identity and military resolve unequaled since the

era of David and Solomon.

The united monarchy had

successfully created Israel's Warrior-God, now the Judaean
kingdom had to resurrect him in an effort to convince the

people to fight unceasingly and unmercifully against the
powerful forces amassing outside the Judaean borders.
As fortune would have it, the timely "discovery" of the

Deuteronomic Law occurred at precisely this juncture in
Judaic history, providing the Judaean king Josiah (622
B.C.E.) with the framework from which a new theocratic

nationalism could be constructed.®'

The chapters of

Deuteronomy included in this fragment, among other things,
expounded upon the events surrounding the Joshuan campaign

in Canaan immediately following the migration of Israelite
tribes from Egypt in the thirteenth century B.C.E.

Given

the lack of archaeological evidence to support the existence
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.

c;

of this campaign, it can be surmised that the Deuteronomic
author responsdble for the Temple Scroll created this story

for reasons comprehensible only to the intended audience of
his day.

What was the underlying political and social

environment that determined the views of that audience,
then?

In 622 B.C.E., during the reign of Josiah, the southern
kingdom still reeled from the paralyzing shock of the eighth
century Assyrian invasion of Israel.

The northern kingdom

withered under this fierce assault, and its people's
political and religious institutions were subsequently
assimilated into Assyrian and Aramaic culture.®^

Ominous

signs in the east indicated the growing power of Babylon; at
best. Survival for the tiny Judaean kingdom seemed tenuous.
The example of northern absorption into Aramaic culture must
have convinced the Deuteronomist of the absolute necessity

for unity and unquestioning loyalty and sacrifice.

It was

no time for scruples in the conduct of war; the situation
called for ruthless defense of the nation, lest the fate of

the north (the annihilation of Judaic culture) should befall
the south.

Interestingly, when one really examines the holy war
exhortations traditionally associated with the discourses of
Moses in Deuteronomy, there appears to be a considerable
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emphasis placed on the uniqueness of Judaic culture and the

danger of its possible "contamihation" by Canaanite
influences.

The; charismatic liberator of Israel Was

;V

portrayed as having urged the Tstaelitea/. when engaging
Hittites, Amorites, Canaanites, Perizzites; Hivites or
Jebusites in battle to:

"...save alive nothing that breatheth,
that they teach you not to do after all
their abominations, which they have done
unto their gods." [Italics

This reference to alien culture is strangely out of context

in an environment of diverse Israelite interests, especially
given the autonomy of the tribal unit.

Simply put, a

unified Israelite culture did not exist in the post-exodus
period of migration; therefore, it could hardly have been in
imminent danger of corruption.

The cultural environment of

the Judaean kingdom in 622 B.C.E., however, inherited the

themes of unification and nationhood so adequately crafted
by the early monarchical and Yahwistic authors, despite the
stresses they had endured after the fragmentation of the

kingdom.

The words of Moses, and many of the "historical"

figures contained in the books of Joshua, Judges, I Samuel

and I and II Kings, arguably belong to Judaic society as;it
existed in Josiah's reign and reflected the influence of a

new author, the Deuteronom.ist, and his political agenda. .
M: ■
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^

This agenda included the insertion of holy war themes in

conquest narratives that possessed great propagandistic
value in the effort to invent a contemporary nationalism.
There is currently a lively discusssion among scholars

with regards to determining the period in which the
Deuteronomic Historian actually exerted his influence on the
scriptural literature of his day.

Martin Noth has concluded

that the entire Deuteronomic History must be the work of a

single individual, operating in post-exilic Palestine.®®
Cross and Nelson, however, are of the mind that an original
body of Deuteronomic writings were completed in the Josian
kingdom and redacted, or edited, during the Babylonian

exile.

It seems, given the connection to its discovery in

the Temple, that this latter view concerning Deuteronomy is

the more reasonable assertion.®®

Despite disagreement upon

the exact date of composition, it is clear that the speeches
of Deuteronomical characters are orations, at variance with

other historical sources, and intended to sway the audience

of a later period.®®

In this way, the period of confederacy

portrayed in the Deuteronomic Book of Judges was transformed
into a mythic era of unification and nationalistic resolve

more typical of the Monarchic period to come.®®
Although the theocratic nationalism that placed the

appropriate political and religious capitol in Jerusalem was
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overthrown in 597 B.C.E. by the Babylonian invasion of
Judah, the stature of the Deuteronomist's work was assured.
v.-

■

The official orthodoxy concerning Judaic prescriptions for

holy war and the future revival of the Jerusalem monarchy
(as exemplified in messianic litrature) was firmly
established in the contributions of the Deuteronomic

author.

What made the ideas of the Deuteronomist "holy",

especially those defining the Judaic concept of war, was
their association with the "social values and ideology of

the Israelite monarchy."''^

The problem of anti-monarchic

sentiment was effectively dealt with through the creation of
myths that portrayed the positive contributions of
"historical" figures (in spite of their character flaws)
In this way, even the negative influence of Solomon could be
construed as harmonious with general messianic and
nationalistic themes.

The reforms undertaken by Josiah in 622 B.C.E.,
although they stressed the themes that would become future
orthodoxy, were entirely too superficial to be of any use to
the Judaean kingdom of the seventh century.

In an attempt

to create cultural unity, the misguided king plunged his
nation headlong into a bloodbath.
native Canaanite rel•igious

Heretic priests and

figures were massacred as Josiah

became obsessed with the unification of society under the
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powerful influence cpf Israelite nationalism.

The

ineffectiveness of Josian reforms influenced the prophet

Isaiah who saw the danger to Judaic culture in spiritual and
ethical terms.

Thus, the efforts of Josiah were received

with some trepidation by the nation and lacked the vitality
to unite the kingdom in the face of Babylonian aggression.
Jerusalem would fall to the conquering armies in 597
B.C.E. ^
In retrospect. the holy war themes that emerged during

the Period of Monarchy represented only a theoretical model
for Judaic warfare, in that they were never provided with

the opportunity for full implementation."^®

The conquest of

Canaan was a mythic event, invented for the purposes of

later monarchic propaganda.

David's exploits did utilize

the crude theocratic nationalism of the day but the model of

the Joshuan campaigns had not been invented yet and by the
time Josiah reigned in Jerusalem it was too late to stem the

tide of Babylonian hegemony.

The Period of Exile was spent

largely reinterpreting the failures of the past and

integrating prophetic themes into scripture.

In this way,

the Priestly Authors explained that had God withdrawn his

protection of Israel, in response to heresy and neglect of
his worship.
As the Assyrian Empire came under the domination of
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the Persiahs, the desire for Israelite repatriation
increased.

In 538 B.C.E., the Israelites were given

permission to return to their lands; an event which

influenced the Priestly Authors to "rewrite" parts of the
Deuteronomic History in I and II Chronicles.

This was

accomplished for the purpose of providing a political model
for the re-establishment of a Davidic kingdom in

Jerusalem.'"'

The restored monarchy was seriously weakened,

however, by a lack of Persian support; it was perceived as a

rallying point around which nationalists would cause

considerable trouble for the Empire.^®

The fracturing of

Judaic politics resulted, in 322 B.C.E., in the absorption
of Palestine (re-settled Canaan) into the Empire of
Alexander, and hence, into the Hellenistic sphere of GraecoRoman culture

Seleucid Domination (201-141 B.C.E)

After the disintegration of Alexander's empire in 305

B.C.E., when administration of the various satrapies was
contested within the upper echelons of Macedonian

leadership, Palestine found itself at the center of a geo

political struggle.

The Ptolemaic Dynasty in Egypt

initially supported the Seleucid cause against Antigonus,
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who had seized the reigns of power in Babylon in 315 B.C.E.
After a decisive victory at Gaza, in 312, Seleucus laid
claim to all the lands west of Babylon, including Syria and
Palestine.

Although Antigonus would try to re-establish his

influence in the region on several different occasions, he

ultimately failed, leaving Seleucid and Ptolemaic interests
to contend for political domination.

For a considerable

length of time, Palestine was to be administered under
Ptolemaic rule; however, in 201 B.C.E., Antiochus III took

advantage of the chaotic situation after the death of

Ptolomy IV Philopator and re-exerted Seleucid control over
the Levant.®^

The process of Hellenization was well under way and
culturally, at least, had achieved some success.

A class of

Hellenized Jews asserted their social and economic influence

in Palestine, complimenting the policies of Antiochus IV

Epiphanes, who now ruled as the Seleucid king.®^

That is

not to say that there was full compliance with Seleucid
interests; the traditionally held view that Jewish
opposition to Antiochus' policies was based upon religious

principle, however, has been largely overstated.

In fact,

Antiochus' agenda was surprisingly liberal, resembling
nothing less than a re-articulation of Alexander's cultural

universalism.

Antiochus' goals were mainly political and he

saw in the promulgation of the Zeus Olympius cult an
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opportunity for national and social unity rather than

religious persecution.®^

Similarly, the intrigues which

resulted in the removal of Onias as High Priest in Jerusalem
can be interpreted as the result of political power
struggles between wealthy Jewish families for prominence in
the community and were not indicative of any particular

religious agenda.®^

The proposed rest^^ucturing of political

power, that would establish Jerusalem as a poJis in the
Hellenistic scheme, galvanized the opposition into an

organized nationalistic movement.®^
In the effort to gain popular support, this movement

utilized a historical holy war propaganda as a type of

unitive methodology.

By this time, however, the political

struggle for independence was indistinguishable from the
ideology it employed.

Whereas ancient theocratic government

had first employed religious ideology, socio-pplitical
independence movements now expropriated it with a devotion

deepened by time and tradition.

Thus, it seems, Antiochus

was entirely justified in equating Jewish religion with
Jewish nationalism, as the armies of Judas Maccabeus

expropriated orthodox theocratic nationalism from the

Deuteronomic literature in the struggle for an independent

Judaea.®®

Indeed, the rebuilt Temple was the central symbol

of opposition in this nationalistic movement, as the
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Maccabean leaders became increasingly obsessed with Seleucid

sabotage of legitimate priestly authority (as evidenced by
the usurpation of Onias).
The "Hasmonean revolt", as it has been

historians, must be adequateTy examined iri social scientific
terms.

To begin with, the word "revolt" is singularly vague

and self-defeating; it implies something between a
revolution and a rebellion.

The nationalistic movement

under the Maccabees was in no sense a revolution.

It neither advocated nor achieved any structural change in
the administration of Judaic government, religious law, or
cultural institutions.

It merely re-articulated the demand

for an autonomous Jewish state with a recognized central .
government in Jerusalem. ,Additionally, it sought to reverse
some of the innovations (especially religious) that had been

introduced by the Seleucids in an attempt to foster
ecumenism.

Antiochus, as determined as he was to introduce

Hellenistic religious forms, did not propose the destruction
of Jerusalem or the influence of the ruling elite there.

He

was merely interested in the subversion of Jewish authority
to his own purposes; in short, he utilized existing Jewish

institutions in pursuit of the Hellenistic cause.

The

nationalistic agenda, in turn, focused on removal of the

Seleucids from power and the restoration of a Jewish state.
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This fact firrtily establishes the "Hasmonean revolt" as
nothing more than an uprising, or rebellion, with limited

objectives.

Were these objectives indicative of a spiritual agenda,
as traditional sources have so insistently maintained?

There is evidence to suggest that the Hellenistic reform of

Temple worship threatened the political interests of
Jerusalem more than it did the spirituality of its

inhabitants.

If the Judaean population recognized their

monotheism as an object that had withstood incredible odds
,and countless threats to its existence, then the Hellenistic

reforms represented merely another temporary burden that the

Jewish nation would have to endure.

There were political

reasons, however, for opposition to Seleucid policies.

Chief among them was the notion that growing dissatisfaction
with the Judaic temple cult (indeed, the entire Jerusalem

bureaucracy) was increasing among the native (Palestinian)
population.

This translated as increased support for the

policies of Antiochus.

Since the re-establishment of an

Israelite kingdom in Palestine, the centralization of

political and religious authority in Jerusalem had achieved
unprecedented levels.

The temple sacrifice and laws of

ritual observance, as well as staggering taxes in support of
the bureaucracy in Jerusalem, produced an increasingly
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hostile underclass, known as the am ha-arez, who saw the

Hellenistic reforms as a welcome respite from the economic

and ritualistic burdens placed on them.®®
Ultimately, however, the theocratic nationalism of

scripture was too compelling to ignore and the exhortations
to action, which were now laced with the religious fervor of
the mythic kingdoms of David and Solomon, began to fall on

interested ears.®®

Holy War, in its final incarnation as a

Judaic nationalistic instrument, was finally being waged
against the Hellenistic unbeliever.

In this environment of

religious nationalism, the propaganda of the political
opposition expropriated the apocalyptic terminology (usually
reserved for messianic literature) that defined their

enemies as "abominations" in the eyes of the Lord.®°

Roman Occupation of Palestine (62 B.C.E.-135 C.E.)

By 142 B.C.E., the Seleucids had succumbed to Jewish

nationalist demands, exempting Judah from taxation and
allowing the emergence of Simon Maccabeus "great high-

priest, military commissioner, and leader of the Jews" to

assume the mantle of theocratic power and authority in

Jerusalem.®^

With the advent of Roman political influence

in the region, Judah's brief attempt to reassert the
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theocratic principle of government abruptly ended.®^

If

religious objections to Hellenistic assimilatiohistpdiicies
had been the decisive factor in the popularity of Maccabean
holy war, then one would expect to find a decrease of

nationalistic tendencies in the period of Roman Occupation
of Palestine.

The Romans, unlike the Seleucids, saw no

compulsion to force an ecumenism on the native peoples they
conquered, especially if those peoples possessed the

historical and scriptural tradition that typified the
religion of the ancient Jews.

If an ecumenism developed on

its own, so much the better; however, the Romans perceived
the safest road to political stability to be paved with

accomodation and protection of indigenous culture.
Despite this, a vibrant nationalism emerged in Roman
Palestine that claimed its inheritance from the Maccabean

(Hasmonean) uprising of the second century B.C.
Given the absence of a threat to religious authority,
there arose two separate and distinct Judaic "attitudes" ■,
during this period.

The "universalistic" attitude tended to

focus on religious themes and largely avoided contemporary

political reality (consequently surviving well into the
period of diaspora) .

The "particularistic" attitude was a

political manifestation of nationalistic trends and

represented a continuation of the Maccabean struggle.®^
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Additionally, several groups existed in Judaic society that
advocated a variety of responses to the imperialism of Rome;
assimilationists, isolationists, and nationalists.

The

assimilationists saw no disadvantage in the marriage between
Judaic and Roman culture; consequently, they cooperated

fully with Roman political authority.

This group was

comprised of wealthy individuals, many of whom occupied high
priestly office.®®

Isolationists were apathetic to foreign

domination as long as they were left alone to their

intellectual and spiritual pursuits.

Nationalists, of

course, would countehance no toleration of any alien

government of Palestine, let alone the presence of the
arrogant Romans.

It was indeed the case that Roman government of

Palestine was especially cruel, and was demonstrated by the

lack of charatter and foresight of several governors.®^
Increasingly, the Judaean "monarchy", which was revived by
the Roman triumvirate's endorsement of the Edomite Herod/

was regarded as an instrument of apostasy and betrayal.

The

final insult to Judaic nationalists was the partition of

Palestine in 57 B.C.E. by Gabinius.

This act effectively

shattered any political cohesion that had tenuously existed

in the province.

A testimony to the strength and durability

of nationalism in Judaic society exists in the fact that no
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amount of public deference to the institution of the temple
(as exhibited by

construction) could sway the

zealots from their cause: political independence for

Jerusalem.

By now, because of a Roman policy of

accomodationy the Cause had been stripped of its religioUs

tpappin^^

Spiritually minded Jews busied themselves with

the ritual observance allowed by the Romans and their own
intellectual pursuits.

Realistically, then, the zealots

(and those who would come after them during the Bar Kokhba
rebellion) were political agitators, not holy warriors.
For almost fourteen hundred years, Judaic nationalism,
founded on the principles of theocratic government and
centralization of authority in Jerusalem, had worked with

sporadic success to rid the Jewish people of unwanted

foreign domination.

The rhetoric of holy war had helped to

formulate the groundswell of support that made these
principles attainable.

In the attempts of the Deuteronomist

to construct a national past, we can see how, in scripture,

"history" became "rhetoric".®®

The strongest theocratic and

holy war concepts emerged from .periods in which Judaic

society experienced great turmoil and social upheaval: The

periods of confederacy, Solomonic government/ Assyrian
conquest, Seleucid domination, and Roman occupation.

It/ ; ,

would only be the Hasmonean rulers of the second century:
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^

B.C.E., however, who would actually enjoy the fruits of
total theocratic power.

It has been argued by some that

Judaic holy war, precisely because it was fashioned in

periods of crisis when Israelite political power was weak,
was never implemented at all.®®

Given the current research

regarding the episode at Masada, it seems premature to deny
that a committed Jewish nationalism (translated into holy
war rhetoric) existed, at least in Roman Palestine, perhaps

even ioefore then.

Perhaps it is true that even the

monarchic rulers of Israel had been too weak to wage holy
war; however, the Hasmonean revolt and subsequent opposition
to Roman authority in Palestine certainly took on the

aspects of a holy struggle.^°°
The nationalism of theocracy was born of necessity. ,

All around the fledgleing Israelite kingdoms larger, more
dominating powers existed.

For the Jews of the Exodus, God

had provided them with the stability they needed.
Eventually, as rulers sought to create the sense of national

and cultural identity so essential for a united people, they

relied on the powerful forces of spirituality.

A holy war

mentality was seen as a vital component of that effort.

In

the effort to understand the human proclivity for war, we
must acknowledge that religion is often expropriated as an

ideology.

That is not to say that religion has no
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culpability in the ability to arouse fervor and conviction;
however, if one were to eliminate the political motivations
for war that typify theocratic government and social

activism, then it might well prove that the essential
conditions for "religious war" have diminished.

the case in Roman Palestine.

Such was

When the religious agenda was

removed from the political struggle for independence, the
zealots were left with a rhetoric devoid of spiritual

exhortation.

After the fall of Jerusalem, the political

motives that inspired Judaic holy war would remain dormant
until the emergence of the Zionist movement and the
establishment of the modern Israeli state.
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GHAPTER TWO: THE CHRISTIAN SWORD

as a propagandistic tooi of
theocratic government with a means for unifying and

cpordinating national sentiment in a highly cprapetitive
environment.

Unlike ancient Judaism, Christianity did not

emerge as a faith defined by land covenant.

That is to say,

although Jesus proclaimed the establishment of a "new

covenant" between God and His people, the contract was

understood in spiritual terms and gradually assumed
universal applications.

While God's first covenant had

promised land (thereby inferring nationhood) to the Hebrew

tribes, it was unclear if the new relationship recognized

the necessity for a theocratic nation at all, especially
given the fact that the "New Jerusalem" was seen as a

heavenly city, opened to all who believed.

In this sense,

the focus of Christianity was not to conquer so much as it
was to proclaim the message, attract converts, and endure

persecution.

Eventually, the Christian Church would develop

alongside secular institutions (like the imperium and local

kingship) that would challenge its status as a theocracy
throughout the Medieval Period.

In a way, Christian

theocracy was a three-headed hydra, each head representing
the competing agendas of imperial expansion, papal reform
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and local ]<i.ngsliip.

Initially/ like the Israelites of the

Ancient Period, the Christians found themselves in a chaotic

and competitive enyironment fighting for their very Survival

in an empire in which they were regarded as political and
religious dissidents.

It seemed reasonable, then, that this

new faith would develop some justification for conflict,
especially given the challenges it faced.

After the

conversion of Constantino in 312 C.E., it became clear that

a national Christian ideology was imminent.

Thus began the

development of Christian holy war. '

It is true that the development of Christian scripture
was a product of its time, just as the books of the Torah
were of theirs; but, because of the immediacy of the events
that it purported to describe, the New Testament's agenda :
was more rigid than that of the Old Testament.

To a large

extent, Judaic holy war benefitted from the utilitarian

approach of the Israelite community regarding scripture;
essentially, scripture was molded in Israel to fit the
designs of its theocratic leaders.

While Judaic holy war

themes advanced, receded, and re-emerged over a period of

nearly a thousand years of scriptural development, Christian
;holy war emerged independent of any comparitively long
scriptural history, relying instead on the initial Gospel
formulated in the first three centuries of Christian
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thought.

Depriyed of a fluid scriptural tradition, the

medieval Church found it necessary to interpret this Gospel

loosely in an attempt to establish a Christian perogative
for defense.

Although, in this sense, scripture was^

Utilized as propaganda, Christians often found New Testament

references ambiguous and misleading.

For this reason, the

Church augmented its defense of Christian warfare with Old
Testament verses.

With a "deadline" proposed for the

acceptance of public revelation after the codification of
scripture in 397 C.E., the historical development of
Christian holy war theries, based on interpretive elements,
became even more apparent.

Briefly outlined, the major trends in Christian

history, philosophy, and culture that contributed to the
concept of holy war, culminating in the Crusades, were as
, follows.:

(1) Initial toleration of baptism for those
Serving in the military.
(2) A "hostile" reaction to persecution and
a negative view of military service
(reliance on "pacifistic" teachings of
Christ).
(3) Conversion of Constantino and an

acceptance of military service in the
defense of a "Christian Empire" (a
permanent fixture in the east).

(4) A theoretical justification for war

61

against "injustice" and an articulation
of holy war as the prerogative of
Christian rulers by Augustine (reliance
on O.T. and ambiguous N.T. texts).

(5) Decline of the Western Imperium. German
Comiaanders defending remnants of a
Western "Christian Empire".
(6) A resurgence of "anti-militancy" among
Christian writers and Arian kings (in
the west), Papal defense of military
service as a "lesser virtue".

(7) Imperial power re-asserted in the west
(Justinian's conquests),

(8) Western suspicion of Byzantine motives.
Cautious Papal contacts and eventual
alliance with Germanic military powers.

(9) Islamic expansion in the east.
Implementation of Augustine's holy
war model by a secular ruler

(Charlemegne).

Wars fought to

defend and extend the faith. Papal
objections.

(10) Ninth century invasions from Muslim,
Viking, and Magyar armies. Increasing
dependence on military force for
survival. Bishops become vassals in
the feudal system.

(11) Emergence of the Pope as a military
leader. Papal campaigns against the
Normans and Henry IV. Rise in the
"ethos of knighthood" and the holy
war,s of the "reconquista" in Spain.
(12) Crusade.
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The First Two Centuries of" Christianity

Amid the earliest Apostolic contacts with the west,
both Peter and Paul attracted a small segment of the Jewish

population in Rome.

Christianity's reputation as a

messianic "mystery cult" inevitably grew, appealing to

another, much larger, constituency: the Roman army.

Pre

occupied as they were with concepts such as death,

resurrection, and personal salvation, Roman soldiers (who

retained the western prejudice for tangible philosophies)
welcomed a religion whose saviour's existence was well
established in the historical record.

The best evidence

suggesting a sizable Christian presence in the army of Rome

comes from Tertullian (200 C.E.) in his attempt to quiet

suspicions concerning the popularity of the new faith.
Tertullian, of course, would reverse himself and argue

passionately against military service when Christian
attitudes, fueled by persecution, hardened and he drifted
inexorably toward Montanist heresy.
These persecutions would have a profound effect upon

later generations of Christians and their participation (or
criticism) of.military service. The first century
persecutions under Nero,and Domitiah tended to be sporadic,
local affairs, unremarkable in their lack of breadth and
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zeal.

The second century persecution orchestrated during

the reign of Marcus Aurelius, however, produced a pervasive

anti-militancy in the Christian body.^°^

The dual nature of

the Roman state as a pagan entity and political oppressor

only exacerbated this process.

Throughout the first two

hundred years of Christianity, however, there seemed to be
considerable confusion regarding the proper Christian
response to war.

Interestingly, first century Christians borrowed

heavily from the miltaristic vocabulary (bequeathed to them
by the Deuteronomic author of the Torah) in an attempt to

convey a sense of spiritual warfare.^°^

Although this

language was largely metaphorical, it belied a lack of
consensus either for or against miliary service, even as

late as the second century C.E.

Certainly, Paul's opinions

regarding obedience to civil authority stood in stark
contrast to the second century idealism of St. Justin
Martyr.

St. Justin's intriguing reference to "every other

kind of iniquity" suggests that oppostion to military

service may, at least in part, have been motivated by antipagan rather than pacifistic tendencies.

Many more

Christians heeded the words of Jesus and rendered "to Caesar

what belonged to Caesar".^°^
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Third Century Christianity

However Christians defined their duties to the state in

these first critical years, by the third century, largely
attributable to' the cult of martyrdom and a growing

resentment of Roman political authority, perceptions were

clearly changing.

Tertullian, who had boasted of Christian

service in the armies of Rome, now in 210 C.E. completely a

Montanist, bitterly railed against Christian hypocrites who

betrayed their faith by enlistment.^"®

His arguments were

coherent, although regrettably tainted by his fierce anti-

pagan agenda.^"''
pacifism."®

Others, like Hippolytus, embraced a genuine

These third century Christian pacifists

selectively utilized the various teachings of Jesus that
complimented their agenda (Mt.5:9, 26:52; Lk.6:27-28 and
Jn.18:36).

It must be remembered that, although these

teachings carried considerable authority, they had not yet
reached the status of canonical scripture.

Consequently, it

was easy for pacifists to circumvent .the more ambiguous,

less friendly references to militancy in the teachings of
their master (Mt.8:5-13, 10:34-36, Lk.14:23, 22:36 and

Jn.2:15).^^°

The pacifistic school ignored the Old Testament

altogether, not only because of its Warrior-God, but also

because there was a growing sense among all Christians that
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the old covenant was now superceded by the new.^^^
At the same time that pacifism was beginning to emerge

as a Christian ethic/ another perspective was being

developed that also found its inspiration in the sufferings
of the martyrs.

In short, the suffering endured by the

persecuted Christians of the second century was increasingly
seen as having cleansing or purgative properties

As the

purgative effect of martyrdom was acknowledged, Christians
began to see the efficacy of sharing the blessings derived

from suffering with those misdirected individuals who
espoused heresy. Just as faith in suffering was proclaimed a
victory in the war against personal sin, so would the

application of suffering be proclaimed a valid weapon in the
war against heresy.

As will be seen, this constituted the

first expression of a militant attitude in Christian
culture; one which would eventually be directed at the

heretic population with purgative measures intended to
cleanse them of their perceived iniquities.

In a sense,

Christian warfare developed from within, as a response to

those in Christian society who threatened its unity. In the

third century, however, there was no recognizable Christian

society to speak of; cohsiequently, the "positive" attributes
of suffering remained an element of mythic martyrdom.

As

the fourth century approached, the cultural environment of
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the Roman empire was to undergo a fiindamental alteration.

I

Fourth Century Christianity

Amid the chaotic disintegration of the Roman Tetrarchy

in 312 C.E., the ambitious general Constantine achieved a

significant military victory at the Milvian bridge just
outside of Rome.^^^

By itself, this battle would have hardly

mattered; the events that subseguently transpired

constituted nothing less than a revolution in the way
Christians viewed the world around them.

Constantine, the

Christians insisted, had received a sign from God.

There

was some initial confusion, however, regarding the proper

interpretation of this sign.

While some claimed it was the

symbol of "Sol Invictus" (the Unconquered Sun), others, >
especially thoue who kept the general's confidence,
identified it as the "Chi-Ro" of Christian symbology.

What

is clear is that Constantine regarded Christianity in a much

more favorable light after his victory.

Specifically,

Constantine's so-Called conversion to Christianity would

have a significant impact on the Christian concept of war
throughout the medieval period.
The Edict of Milan produced a surge of mass conversions
to the Christian faith, the extent of which has never been
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duplicated in history.

These new Christians were

fundamentally committed to the preservation of the empire.

The myth of the Milvian bridge loomed large, convincing many
that the empire enjoyed the blessings of God; consequently,
it now deserved their protection.

In a move startingly

similar 'to Josiah's purge of the Judaean Kingdom in 622

B.C.E., Constantine attempted to unify Roman society under
the banner of Christianity.

Although he remained somewhat

tolerant of traditional Roman religion at first, Constantine
was eventually swayed by Christian sentiment to deny access
to the ancient cultic temples.

In this way, Constantine

sought to establish the "peace of the church" throughout his
empire.

The language of this attempt at theocratic nationalism
echoed the extreme lessons of martyrdom; purgation^
chastisement^ salvation.

It was theocratic all the more

because the,emperor now regarded himself as Tsapostolos, or
equal in stature to the original apostles.

Church and state

were intimate partners in this endeavor, striving to
rediscover a national purpose under the auspices of
Christian unity.

Constantine adopted a strinkingly severe

policy in regard to pagans and heretics; he soon enacted
legislation that would punish those who disobeyed Imperial
decrees with death.

It is difficult to ignore the
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connections between this policy and the contemporary

acknowledgment of martyrdom's efficacy.

Additionally, this

strident attitude was influencing Christian attitudes toward
war.

War in the service of a Christian empire, like capital

punishment as a means of Christian unity, was increasingly

seen as a positive good.

Thus, it is apparent that a

militant response was developing, throughout the duration of
Constantino's reign, as a means of achieving the "pre

determined ends" of Roman government: territorial integrity
and social stability.

.

(.

Fifth Century Christianity

The militancy of Christian society would be Codified in

theory by the chief theologian of the next generation,

Augustine of Hippo (354-430 C.E.).

Influenced by the

harshness of the Theodosian Code and the increasing
instability of the western empire in the late fourth and
early fifth centuries, Augustine articulated a coherent

philosophy designed to justify the use of force from a
Christian perspective.

For Augustine, the problem was

essential: how may Christians defend empire and faith
without violation of the gospel message?

The military

threats were predominantly from Germanic tribes to the north
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who pressed in on the Roman frontier with uncomfortable

regularity.

Domestically, Christianity was besieged by a

heretical fringe that threatened to splinter the fragile
unity of the theocratic state.

In regard to heresy,

Augustine, at first optimistic about the church's prospects

for establishing a constructive dialogue, urged restraint
After his episcopate at Hippo (and the protracted conflict
with the Donatist heresy), however, Augustine would become
considerably disillusioned.

In actuality, largely due to the deterioration of the
western empire (which had been hastened by the demise of the
last effective emperor in Rome) Christians increasingly
found themselves adrift in a sea of conflicting loyalties.
Some still held out hope that with such able commanders as
Stilicho and Aetius holding the Vandals and Burgundians in
check, there was still a western Christian empire worth
defending.

Others, surrounded by the reality of imperial

decay, acknowledged that the mantle of defense had been
inherited by the institutional Church.

To a very large

extent, Augustine belonged to this group.

He had always

been critical of Rome from a cultural and spiritual
perspective.

The idea of Roman culture in decline delighted

him; indeed, when Rome was besieged in 410 he refused to
mourn its passing.

The concept Of theocracy, however.
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intrigued him and he increasingly urged the state to take

repressive measures in the war against heresy.
Interestingly, Augustine seemed at home in both camps,

weaving his theory of militancy deep within the fabric of
ehristian society.

There were some in the Church, however, for whom the
mantle of defense was an unwelcome burden.

These dissenters

issued a renewal of third century pacifism that stood in

opposition to the "disturbing innovations" of Augustinian
theory."®

For one thing, Augustine had compromised his

early views on heresy, taking a much harder line in his
opposition to the heretical agenda.

By 417 C.E., he was

convinced that "righteous persecution" was an indespensable

weapon in the Christian arsenal, to be used against heretics
with "the spirit of love"."®

The principal opponents of

Augustine's new found fervor included such respected
Christian figures as Socrates Scholasticus, Sulpicus
Severus, and Vincent of Lerins.

All articulated the

traditional third century response to crisis within the

Church; to paraphrase St. Vincent: "to cleave to antiquity,
leaving the impious crowd to its own madness.

Applying this same sense of urgency to the problem of
national defense, Augustine established the rule by which
Christians could effectively measure the efficacy of a
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E)otential war.

Specific Gonditions were rendered for the

waging of "just wars" utilizing Constantino's "peace of the
church" as a model.

Far from, the third century Christian

ethic, Augustine now regarded military service as nothing

less than a charism.i^^ ; The single requirement ifor the
waging of just war, however, was clearly articulated, "A
just war", Augustine asserted, "is justified only by the
injustice of the aggressor.
there, however.

Augustine did not stop

A true creature of the Constantinan Age,

the north African bishop proceeded to develop a theory by
which a Christian ruler could wage "holy war", with

considerably less restrictions than those imposed on just
war.

The Christian ethic, according to Augustine, should

always be guided by "rational justice".

It should be noted,

that there is a noticable lack of recourse to "injustice"

as a pre-condition for holy war in Augustine's appeal.

By

the fifth century, war could be waged "at God's bidding" and
heresy exterminated by God's authorization of a "general
law", allowing "certain exceptions."

There is an obvious

influence of Old Testament kingship in Augustine's writings

on the subject of holy war.

In the final analysis,

Augustine acknowledged that the "writings of Moses" did
indeed bear relevancy to the fifth century Christian world.

There was, of course, disagreement with Augustine's
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theories on the matter.

Orusius, for one, saw evidence of

God's hand even in the threatening advance of the Germanic

tribes into Roman territory.

Interestingly, it was in the

quasi-heretical world of secular authority that some of the
most moderate voices were heard.

At the very end of the

fifth century, long after the seizure of Ravenna by Odoacer

and the disappearance of the western imperium, Theodoric (an
Arian Ostrogoth) called for the establishment of toleration
and restraint.

Theodoric's "enlightened" views, however,

were ultimately tainted by his heretical stance, as he could

hardly argue for militancy in the face of his own opposition
to Christian orthodoxy.

Additionally, the necessities of

territorial integrity were too immediate for the Christian
world to ignore, and, despite differing views on the

Empire's value vis-a-vis the Christian Society, Augustine's
views increased in popularity.
At the center of this fifth century controversy stood

the papacy.

,

Increasingly, ever since the power vacuum left

by the death of Valentinan I in 375 and the sack of Rome by
Alaric in 410, the bishop of Rome had gradually accrued

secular authority to himself, having been left in charge of.
the defenses of both Rome and its surrounding Italian lands.

He realized only too well the necessities of civil defense,

and yet, he still considered it his prime duty to preserve
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the "purity" of the Gospel message.

Leo the Great, who

ascended to the papacy in 440 C.E., accepted Augustine's

premise that force should used to defend the Christian
society.

That force, in Leo's view, should have been the

imperial army; as a practical matter, it was not.

The very

idea of Christians themselves fighting and killing in wars
horrified Leo.

Soldiers, he could theofize, at least were

capable of delaying baptism until the distasteful work of
military service was completed.

For baptised Christians, it

was unthinkable to even contemplate returning to military
service after "having done penance".

Leo also compared

military service unfavorably to the vocations of monastic
life, establishing it as a "lesser virtue

Ironically, the answer to the pope's dilemma lay in

compromise with the Arian Germanic tribes.

Theodoric,

although his Arianism would not allow him to defend the
Church per se, still saw ample reason to defend the borders
of what had been the old Christian Empire.

The Church, of

course, realized that this included, the lands under its

authority.

This effectively relieved the papacy (which had

been occupied since 482 C.E. by Felix II) of the
responsibility of Christian defense; for the present moment,
Arian armies Would secure western lands and provide some

political stability for the Church to attend to liturgical,
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dQctrinal, and bureauGratid matters.

The Myth of the Monolithic Church

Historians since the Enlightenment have painted a

gloomy picture of the Middle Ages, often contrasting the

perceived brilliance of their own age with the environment
of the "Dark Ages".

The terminology itself ("Enlightenment"

vs. "Dark" Ages) belies a conscious attempt to interpret

history.

The most enduring stereotype of medieval Europe is

that of the "monolithic Church".

As the chaotic events of

the fifth century unfolded, the western Church emerged as a

political, bureaucratic, and administrative institution that
worked to build a foundation of Christian culture in post-

imperial Europe.

The power this Church wielded, however,

was largely symbolic and indirect.

That is to say, that

whenever moral or doctrinal questions were addressed,

secular authority normally deferred to the prestige of the

Roman pontiff; political matters were often considered the
perogative of kings.

Popes could advise, cajole, even

threaten monarchs; without the resolve to militarize and

raise armies, the fifth century Church was a mere paper

tiger. ' \
In the absence of any real power, papal statements
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often utilized a high degree of hyperbole, claiming

authority in matters usually considered the domain of
secular rulers.

Whereas the Constantinian model of

theocracy provided for the administration of Church affairs
by the state, the Church now attempted, with modest success,
to construct a theocracy in which the state was administered

by the ecclesiastical bureaucracy.

Consequently, the Church

extended its secular authority to the lands surrounding Rome
and central Italy (a development hardly surprising, given

the emerging Papal role in civic defense), in addition to
the larger imperial claims it was making in the west.
Indeed, the self-defined mission of the Church had changed
much since the reign of Valentinian I, when the bishops

could say, "The state is not in the Church, but the Church
is in the state.

In this regard, the chair of Peter was

engaged in a risky enterpise; the Germanic kings saw little
reason to respect the territorial claims of a Papacy that
had denounced their own Arian faith.

What the Church

needed, and spent considerable time nurturing, was a core of
Germanic support for Latin Christianity.

Sixth Century Christianity

Perhaps the most timely conversion in Christian history
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occurred in 500 C.E. as Clevis, a Frankish king, accepted
the Latin faith.

Much more than Thedoric, Glovis was the

living embodiment Of fierce Germanic kingship; and now,

fotunately for the Church, he was orthodox.

Even during the

years preceding his conversion, the Church recognized a
quality in Clevis that made him a desirable asset.
Ecclesiastical leaders tried to moderate his intemperate

personality, often advising him in secular affairs.

A

theme of divine providence permeated the story of his

conversion, perhaps an apocryphal attempt to illustrate the

importance of the event by comparing it to Constantino's

experience in 312.

Significantly, this myth contained an

action of God on behalf of Clovis' army, much like that

performed at the Milvian Bridge."^

Clovis' conversion paved

the way for the inclusion of many Germanic, previously
Arian, tribes (like the Burgundians) in the communion of
Latin Christianity.

Politically, there would be no

immediate solutions for the papacy; parochial issues still
impeded the progress of a unified Christian culture.
Concurrent to this period of gradual Frankish hegemony,

there occurred a general "Germanization" of the episcopate
in response to Church decrees forbidding the clergy from

bearing arms in defense of the Merovingian state.
was typified by the institutionalization of Germanic
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This

cultural norms regarding warfare within the philosophy of
western Christendom.

Although the Church still chafed at

the prospect of Christians fighting wars, the growing
intimacy with Clovis would have profound consequences for
Medieval political history; particularly, that pertaining to
the methods employed by the Church for its very survival.
The notorius "blood-feuds" of the Franks, for example, and

the influence they wielded on an increasingly German

episcopate would hamper papal attempts to restrict warfare
to the unbaptised secular world.

Similarly, Germanic laws governing the brutal
institution of trial by ordeal helped to shape a western

European culture that was heir to this Germanic/Classical
Christian synthesis.

In the,attempt to effectively

Christianize the various elements of Prankish culture,

Martin of Tours would go so far as to expropriate all
secular functions, even those traditionally associated with
militarism, and absorb them into the heirarchical structure
of the Church.

Christianization was an intricate process,

given the resiliency of native culture; a militant approach
only made it even more difficult.
Adding to the turmoil of this chaotic environment was
an effort to reconquer western lands by the Emperor

Justinian in Byzantium.

In response to an increasingly
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hostile Arian presence in Europe, Justinian attempted to

reunite the last vestiges of Constantino's Christian Empire;

unfortunately for imperial interests, he was only partly
successful.

Although many lands were recovered, they soon

reverted to Arian control after the eventual retreat of

Byzantine forces.

What was far more significant about the

Justinian conquests was the role it played in resurrecting
ideas of empire, especially in western minds.

Additionally, the unsolicited presence of Byzantine
armies in the west only fueled suspicion of Imperial
motives, thereby strengthening papal resolve to pursue

alternative options for political stability and survival.
These included the forging of closer ties with Frankish

kingdoms.

By 579, Pope Gelasius II, recognizing the

vulnerability of the Church in the west, entertained
thoughts of a formal alliance with the Franks.
Interestingly, it was Gelasius who would develop the popular
"two swords" philosophy of Medieval Christianity.

Briefly

put, this theory argued that there were two sources of

authority in a Christian society, spiritual and secular, and

that the spiritual,authority always eclipsed that of the
secular domain.

This principle applied not only in Roman

civil affairs, but those involving the larger Christian

community.

It is hard not to acknowledge the parallels
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between Gelasius' and Martin of Tours' concepts of Christian
authority.
As the Lombard threat in Italy increased, a man of

exceptional political talents ascended to the chair of St.
Peter.

Gregory the Great clearly recognized the nature of

the Church's dilemma and strengthened diplomatic ties with

the Merovingian dynasty of the Franks.

For the first time

in the short history of the Church, a pope now openly
embraced Christian militarism.

In a bold move intended to

distance the political objectives of the west from those of

the east, Gregory rebuked the emperor in Byzantium for his

support of legislation prohibiting soldiers from pursuing
monastic vocations upon retirement.

Certainly, military

service was still regarded as a "lesser virtue"; however,

Christians were no longer prohibited from taking an active
role in the defense of Christian society.

How much did these changing attitudes change practice
in the sixth century Church?

For one thing, it is difficult

to believe that the ancient custom of witholding baptism for

those in military service was enforced any longer.

In

essence, monastic life had replaced baptism as the Christian
object denied the soldier.
monastery for the army.

No one was allowed to leave the

Still, even as an imperfect

vocation, military service would become a integral part of

western ehristendoni.

The Church now bent itself to the task of forging

alliances.

Gregory ordered missionaries like Augustine On

ambitious trips deep into the heart of Germanic and British
territory in an attempt to spread the Gospel, standardize

liturgical forms, initiate Latin reforms, and establish
political alliances with many of the powerful kingdoms of
the west.

As an increasing number of rulers came under the

banner of Latin Christendom (now an emerging concept), Rome

enjoyed a new status as an administrative, legal and

political center.

Many of the newly Christianized kingdoi^s

would look to Rome for guidance in the areas of legal

structure, religious orthodoxy, political stability (through
divine sanction) and morality.

This misled the Church into

thinking that secular rulers had abdicated political control
to the ecclesiastical government of a Christian Europe.
Increasingly, diobedience to religious authority was

perceived as treason to the state.
hot shared by secular rulers.

This perspective was

Cultural influences, the

political neccessities of local rule, and the development of
coitimori law all influenced the actions of kings far more than

papal decrees from Rome; still, deference was paid, at least

superficially, to the structure that made it all possible:
the institutional Church.
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Seventh and Eighth Century Christianity

Papal-Frankish relations grew at an astonishing pace

throughout the seventh and well into the eighth century C.E.
Gregory II, ascending to the Papacy in 715, utilized the
talents of St. Boniface to reform the Prankish church and

lay the groundwork for official alliance.

In 726, these

efforts seemed inspired when the Emperor in Byzantium, Leo
III (Isurian) broke with orthodoxy on the issue of icons.

No longer could the western Church rely upon the rhetoric of
"empire" to summon aid from the east.

In 726, Pope Gregory

III appealed to the Carolingian chieftan Charles Martel for

aid against the Lombards in northern Italy and was refused.
Undaunted, the succeeding Pontiff (Stephen II) turned to

Charles' son, who desperately wanted papal sanction for

usurpation of the Frankish throne, with the same appeal.

In

this way, all the efforts to build an alliance bore fruit.
In 754 C.E., Pepin recieved the blessings of the papacy in
his attempt to establish a Carolingian hegemony and the
Frankish-Papal Alliance was sealed.
The Church how had its defender; however, this

arrangement would prove to be disasterous for ecclesiastical
authority.

At first, events seemed to favor the pope.

In

his first impressive show of military force, Pepin subdued
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the Loii±)ard advance and claimed extensive territories for

the Frankish dominion.

Upon regarding the Italian lands

that had become the secular domain of the Church since the

collapse of the western Empire, Pepin was presented with the
tradition of Constantine's "Donatio" and relented,

establishing the Church's secular authority over these

territories in perpetuity.

Although Pepin deferred to the

authority to the Church, his son, Charles "the Great", would
make it absolutely clear by whose authority the papacy
possessed Italian lands.

Charlemagne (768-814 C.E.)

Amid the confusion of eighth century Roman politics,
the reigning pope found himself besieged by powerful

patrician families.

These families brought serious charges

against Leo III, fanning the flames of popular sentiment and
threatening his very life with mob defiance.

Charles the

Great in his Carolingian lands to the north, witnessed these
events with some discomfort.

After receiving and absolving

the embattled pope (through traditional German ritual) the

Carolingian monarch was crowned Holy Roman Emperor by Leo.^^^
Some have seen this interchange as a complex power play by

secular and religious authorities: Charles by his absolution
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of the Pope establishing his dominance in the relationship;
Leo by his crowning of Charles proclaiming the pre-emminence
of Papal authority.

What is clear is that Charles now saw

himself as the divinely appointed ruler of a new Christian

empire.

He quickly began work on establishing a secular

administration that would rival the institutional Church's.

To some degree, Charles' was the only true theocratic
administration of the early Medieval period, in that it was

realized rather than theoretically proclaimed.

Church

prelates were constantly preaching the superiority of
ecclesiastical authority from a position of weakness; 
Charles, meanwhile, was making good on his promises of

absolute and complete power.

Charles, blessed by the

presence of learned Celtic monks in his realm, also

witnessed the initial stages of a "Carolingian renaissance."
One of the Classical texts available to the emperor, indeed
his favorite work of Christian philosophy, was Augustine's

City of God.^^^
It was no coincidence, then, that Charlemagne was the

first theocratic ruler to put into practice the more radical

Augustinian theories of Christian warfare, including that
which articulated,a,holy war ethic.

Regarding himself as

Augustine's "sword in the hand" of God, Charlemagne

proceeded to expand the Carolingian hegemony over vast
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expanses of what had once been the western Roman empire.

He

fought against Islamic armies in the southwest, invaded
Bavaria, defeated :&vars and forcibly converted the Saxons in
the east.

Assuredly^ most of this cdnquest was an effort

to extend Charles' own political power and secular influence

throughout Europe; however, he used the nationalism of
religious ideology to achieve his objectives

Clearly,

Charles saw religious authority as a method by which to
further his own territorial and imperial ambitions.

Despite

Papal objections, the art of Christian warfare so amply
cultivated by centuries of political neccesity, finally
blossomed under the secular influence of a fierce Prankish

' king. ■

Ninth Century Christianity

Unfortunately for the Church, matters only got worse.
After the death of Charles, his empire was divided into two

principal regions: east and west Frankia.

In 863, as heir

to the eastern throne, Lothar II found himself in

confrontation with Pope Nicholas I.

By the time Nicholas

and Lothar died, leaving the entire issue of Theutaberga's
restoration and Waldrada's excommunication unresolved,

western imperial armies had marched on Rome and collusion

85

between east and west Frankia had resulted in the partioning
of Italian lands between the two monarchs.

It was during

this time that the Asturians, inspired by the martyrs of

Cordoba in 859, began a long struggle against the Umayyad
emirate for political control of Spain.

These wars of

"reconquista", although they did not receive Prankish

support (Charles the Bald had maintained friendly relations
with the Umayyads), were significant for their holy war
rhetoric.

It seems that when two faiths are at war, the

nationalism of religious ideology becomes all too necessary.

Significantly, the reconquista effort would eventually

capture the attention of imperial interests, providing a
model for the crusading armies to come.
For the moment, the Christians of Europe found

themselves under siege on several fronts simultaneously.

From the mid-ninth century on, waves of Viking invasions
devastated west Frankia, taking the imperial capitol of

Aachen and destroying Cologne, Andernach, and Koblenz.

These Viking incursions met the rapidly moving armies of
Islam in the Mediterranean.

Muslim invasions of Italy,

although not terribly effective, had progressed as far as
Rome on two separate occasions (846 and 849 C.E.).

The flurry of military activity during this period of
European history hampered the ability of Rome to act as the
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"nerve center" of Christendom, directing the secular body

into action in times Of diminished iniperial power.

Secuiar

lords were left to their pwn particular defensive

strategies, faced as they were with their own unique
military threats.

In Charlemagne's empire the necessities

of defense had been relinquished to a secular megalomaniac;

now they were surrendered to local rulers overwhelmed by the
force of Viking invasion.

This general environment of chaos

did not prevent the occasional emperor from intervening,
with regularity, in church affairs. . Finally, the spectacle
of Emperor Louis II manipulating papal elections in 855 was
too much to bear.-^®

After the death of Louis, imperial and

papal power waned, leaving the Church vulnerable to the

warring nobility of the Italian cities.

Increasingly, many

in the Church began to develop a taste for militancy, in

response to the sorry state of ecclesiastical affairs.
During this period as local kings began investing their
own candidates with the symbols of religious authority, many

local bishops became royal vassals, placing their secular
loyalties before their religious obligations to the papacy.
Thus, the "feudalization of the Church" took place; a

process by which war could be effectively preached at the
local level as a religious affair.

As a concession to

traditional Christian exhortations to non-violence, bishops
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would fulfill their feudal obligations by funding armies

through Church coffers rather than fighting; this tended to

put an even greater strain on a centralized bureaucracy in
Rome that, as yet, was still in its infancy and would not
reach its full potential until the reforms of Leo IX in
1052.

Thus, an opportunity for further imperial control

over the Church presented itself.

Tenth and Eleventh Century Christianity

The tenth century would prove to be a period of

recovery for the western imperium as Henry I ascended to the
throne in 919 C.E.

Henry regarded himself as the heir of

Pepin in that he vigorously pursued the conquest of Lombard
lands in Italy and the further "Germanization" of the Church

in imperial territories.

After the intense challenges to

Christian survival in the ninth century and having survived
the incursions of Vikings, Muslims, and Magyars, Europe

welcomed Henry's "holy" mission.

Increasingly, weapons of

war became "holy objects" in this evolving culture of
theocratic nationalism.

Henry's acquisition of the holy

lance from Rudolf II of Burgundy in anticipation of his

campaign against the Lombards was a testament to the
resiliency of Augustine's holy war ideal.
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■ After Henry's' sbnt Cft^tp 1/ consplidated power by
reserving for himself tiie authority to confirm papal
elections in 963, the stage was set for a monuraental:

confrontation with the papacy.

Still, there was a fair

degree of cooperation between the two rulers.
Ecclesiastical support for imperial resurgence brought
about, for the first time, an explicit acceptance of
militarism in the Church.

By 1052, the odd spectacle of an

imperial army led by a reigning pope (Leo IX), marching to
engage the troublesome Normans of southern Italy, outraged
no one.

The political neccesities of the day required such

action.

The theocratic structure of European Christendom,

divided as it was between competing notions of secular vs.

religious authority, was threatened by Norman economic and
political interests.

It responded in a way any government

might be expected to respond.

Half-hearted attempts at establishing "the peace of

God" throughout the Christian domain were nothing more than

policies intended to bring about social stability, rather
than Christian brotherhood.

No sooner had the peace of God

been proclaimed in 1063 when papal blessings were sent to
William the Bastard in his military campaign against AngloSaxon Britain.

Significantly, William rode into battle

armed with religious relics and a papal banner as symbols
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^of' his' right ;caus;e:..;i,,'ii'i

:

European civilization in the eleventh century had
reached a critical point in its history.

Crisis and

conflict now defined the "call to arms" as sacred.

How else

to explain the savagery with which emperor and pope waged
war against one another in the years to come?

The issue of

investiture would produce a tension between the emperor,

Henry V, and Pope Gregory VII that would result in the
actual preaching of a holy war by the pope himself.
Historically, popes had always reserved for themselves the

authority to urge others to action for the defense of the
Christian community.

Leo IX had taken the extraordinary

step of actual command, and now, Gregory would preach a war
intended to enforce the orthodoxy of the Church against an

imperial renegade.

Significantly, disobedience to

ecclesiastical decrees passed in Rome was by this time

regarded by the papacy as nothing less than spiritual
heresy.

The motive for war was self-evident; the

establishment of proper authority in a Christian society.
The methods utilized by Gregory in convincing the German

nobility to oppose Henry, however, were couched in religous
propaganda.

Gregory would eventually devise "ways under

divine inspiration" to wage an effective holy war against

Heriry.^^^ .

90

Culturally, as well, European civilization had produced
the chivalric ideal in which the knight was sworn to defend
his lord and Church.

In the highly competitive

environment of knighthood, religion, feudal obligations, and

violence blended perfectly to produce the fearsome fighting
machine of the Crusades, the Medieval knight.

Also, by the

eleventh century, the reinvigorated reconquista effort

convinced many of the holiness of the political and military
struggle against Islam.

The combination of feudal

politics (in which even vassal bishops preached and funded
holy wars), political struggles between popes and emperors,

systematic invasion, inter-faith conflicts (such as the

reconquista in Spain), and the emerging culture of chivalry,
all converged to produce the appropriate environment for

Urban's preaching of the ultimate Christian holy war in 1095
C.E.

The First Crusade (1095-1099 C.E.)

Karen Armstrong, in her work entitled Holy War. The
Crusades and Their Impact on Today's World, accurately

portrays the excesses of European militarism and its impact
on Islamic perceptions of western culture, including that of
Zionism.

While it is entirely true that Zionism was
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regarded by the

Palestine as just ehother

manifestation of European imperialism, Armstrong tends to

emphasize the excesses of the Crusades, painting them as
irrational wars of spiritual conquest.

;

While she should be

applauded for applying holy war themes to the Christian
tradition, Armstrong's definition of holy war negates

rational intent and imputes a fanatical component to the
medieval Crusades.

In actuality, rationality was always

the motivating factor in the implementation of holy war,
whether waged by Jews, Christians, or Muslims.

The very

fact that theocracies must utilize relevant ideologies in
times of crisis necessitates the definition of holy war as a

rational concept, utilized by intelligent men.

The

Crusades, then must be viewed through the eyes of political
and economic expediency in order to discuss their true
impact on European Christendom.

From the beginning, political and economic motives
lurked behind the decision to preach the First Crusade.
Urban, of course, was responding to Alexius Comnenus'

request for aid in the east; indeed, the idea of a unified :
Christian empire had not quite become extinct..

Politically,

defense of the Christian realm was a consideration.

Although relations with the Fatimids, who controlled access

to many of the holy sites of Palestine, were amiable.
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Turkish niigrations resulted in cohsiderable disruption of
the pilgrimage routes and interfered with the avenues of
trade that linked Europe with the Middle East.

Thus,

economic concerns were prominent in the decision to

intervene militarily.

Fatimid cooperation with Christian

interests was extensiye, effectively proving the weakness of
the religious motive so often associated with the Grusades.
Additionally, the chaotic state Of affairs in western Europe
With lords waging war against each other necessitated Some

policy by which the carnage and destruction could be
limited.

Barring an act of God, the only reasonable

. ,

solution seemed to be the removal of such elements from

society in the service of a cause deemed vital to the
survival of the Christian society.

Finally, the base motive

of economic gain and plunder attracted the voracious
appetite of the western lords.

All of these themes: Byzantine vulnerability,

disruption of pilgrimage routes, feudal competition and
violence in Europe, and economic advantage, were essential
elements in Urban's address at Claremont.

Of course,

racial invective and religious rhetoric were also part of
Urban's speech; however, these were techniques intended to

produce the desired result: a unified European army ready to
defend the interests of state.

93

These interests, it must be

reiterated, were no different than those of any modern

state: political cohesion, social stability, economic
prosperity and territorial integrity.

These are rational

objectives that the Church pursued as a self-perceived
theocratic institution of government.

have clearly recognized this.^^®

Other researchers

Although followers such as

Peter the Hermit were convinced of the holiness of their

mission, there remained a small core of leaders committed to
the achievement of specific objectives in the war effort.
For these men, fanciful ideas of holy war were subordinated
to the political and economic agenda; indeed, many of them

forged lasting ties with their Islamic adversaries once the
political realities of occupation became apparent.
excesses of the CruSades, however, were severe.

The

The

physical punishment of transport alone rendered many in the

army incapable of even a minimal humanity.^®®

Unfortunately,

this has tended to place the Crusades in a particular

category of fanatical warfare.

It is hopeful that the

actions that were the result of deprivation and very real
human suffering on the road to Jerusalem will someday be
balanced with a consideration of the state interests that

propelled the entire crusading effort.

.
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The Spcial Impact of the Crusades

As was mentioned before, the militant attitude of

Augustine's Christianity had found its counterpart earlier
in an evolving attitude concerning the efficacy of

martyrdom.

Increasingly, Christians saw the "purgative"

qualities of suffering and began to apply it to those who

they perceived as needing it the most: heretics.

As

Christian orthodoxy became ever more imperative in a
theocratic environment (at both the ecclesiastical,

imperial, and local level), stringent measures to enforce

the rightness of belief increased.

The Crusading spirit was

effectively absorbed into the social environment of
Christendom, stressing the need for a "reformation of

life."^®^

By 1140, Gratian, in his Decretum (Quaestio 1),

asserted that Christian prerogatives for war were expressed

early on in the Gospels (Lk 3:14)

As various problems

arose in the medieval Christian coJ^unity, heretics became

easy scapegoats for their non-^conformity, refusals to take
oaths, and hyper-ascetic lifestyles.

It was not surprising,

then, that the instrument of crusade was turned against the

Albigensians in 1208 C.E.^®^

In a similar fashion to the

emergence of Judaic prophets after the establishemt of the
Israelite theocratic state, religious ideology (and its holy
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war component) in the Medieval Period became a social
phenomenon in Christendom.

Each time this ideology was

transferred from the realm of the political state to the
social environment, the rational basis for its

implementation was somewhat diminished.

That is to say,

popular culture would manipulate religious ideology in a
much more capricious, arbitrary manner.

The believers, as

opposed to the designers of teligious ideology, were the
true fanatics.

In this way, the multiplicity of religious

issues regarding orthodoxy that developed within Christian
society throughout the late medieval and Renaissance

periods, necessitating the emergence of Inquisitorial courts
and expanded ecclesiastical legal protections, can be seen

as aspects of a true religious war.

As always, the

theocratic state found a way to institutionalize this,
mitigating the harsh realities of the Inquisition until the
spiritual rebellions of the Reformation.
Circumscribed aS it was by the Gospel of the first two

centuries, Christian holy war could only develop so far.

Unlike Judaic holy war, that had developed alongside

scripture, and the fluidity that would typify Islamic
perspectives concerning war, the Church was bound by the

sanctity it had imparted to the writings of a limited number
of apostles in the early Christian community.
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Constantihe

pushed at the boundaries of the tradition that the Church
had received since apostolic times.

Augustine introduced

innovative and controversial theoretical concepts into the

Christian vocabulary regarding the efficacy of war.

Based

on these innovations (none of which were ever promulgated as

doctrines) many in the Church, from Charlemagne to Urban,
advocated an occasionally arbitrary reason for fighting.
Although there were some who espoused the more limited idea
of just war in a Christian society (a concept arguably

allowed by New Testament scripture), there were those who
ignored the practical reasoning of Urban, responding at
Claremont to the call to arms articulated by Augustine, "God
wills it!"
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CHAPTER THREE: THE THEOGRACY OF ISLAM

As the concept is understood by a very large sector of
the Muslim population throughout the world, jihad is a
defensive struggle ppssessed of two dimensions: spiritual
and political.

By far the most noble expression of jihad is

found in the spiritual realm, as it encompasses the inner

struggle of humanity to overcome the oppression of sin and
the influence of evil in the world.

This struggle is

perceived as essential to the purpose of every human being's
life: to draw ever closer to the compassionate embrace of

God.

"Lesser jihad", on the other hand, involves the

political struggle for the survival of the Islamic community

in a world perceived as hostile to its existence.^®''

This

admittedly pessimistic view was indicative of the
competitive social environment of pre-Islamic Arab culture.

As a means of liberation from oppression, this view of jihad
is entirely reactive in the environment in which it
operates.

This does not negate its nature as a product of

theocratic government; in fact, it may be observed that
jihad truly blossomed as an instrument of political ideology
subsequent to the time of Muhhamad's flight from Mecca and :
his eventual establishment of the Medinan umma, or Muslim

community, there.

In the academic community, however.
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several equally inaccurate interpretations of jihad have
emerged.

Two of these prevailing views, orientalist and

.

apologetic, respectively seek to portray Islam as either a
militaristic faith of prosyletization or a prophetic message

of supreme pacifism.

The orientalist perspective,

promulgated by Western sources, is hampered by a notable
lack of objectivity.

Indeed, until very recently, the very

idea of holy war was perceived in the west as having

originated exclusively in the Islamic tradition.

This

approach, however, does not allow for consideration of both
the Deuteronomic and Augustinian models of warfare and their

impact on Muslim populations in the Middle East.

While it

is true that social conditions in Pre-Islamic Arabia

necessitated a religious justification for war, Islam
(incumbent as it was to the Judaeo-Christian heritage for

various components of its theology) was influenced by the
theocratic glory of Jerusalem and the militant posture of
eastern Christians in defense of orthodoxy.

Consequently,

even the apologist perspective fails as it is clear that
Islam espouses no such supreme pacifism.

To the contrary, Islam developed in a highly
competitive social environment that necessitated a mechanism
of political conflict-resolution.
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The surprising aspect of

this mechanism, however, especially given the brutal

realities of pre-Islamic tribal culture that helped to
create it, is how moderate an ideological weapon it actually
was in the hands of the Prophet and his community.

Pertinent to any discussion of jihad and its early
application is the following criteria:

(1) Discussion of problems concerning Qur'anic
citation and interpretation.
(2) Consideration of the tribal conflicts that

typified pre-Islamic Arab culture and, to
some extent, influenced the development of
jihad. i
(3) Clarification of the origins of jihad (his
torically and Scripturally), observing the
development of theoretical models and the
applications of actual strategies in the
course of early Islamic history. This will
entail a discussion of how jihad developed
after the Aqaba Oath, Hijra (flight from
Mecca) and the establishment of the Medinan

Umma as a defensive strategy, in response to
perceived oppression under Quraysh hegemony.
Any exhortation to violence, it will be shown,
involved an implicit context of oppression,
tribal disunity or treason; in essence, it
always pursued an obvious and self-evident
political agenda.

Qur'anic Sources

The immediate problem concerning Qur'anic citation and
interpretation lies in translation.
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It has long been

argued, quite convincingly, that the Qur'an, as a translated
document, is vastly inferior to its original renditions in
Arabic.

In particular, English translations lack the

idioms, nuances, and meaningful inflections that enrich the

Qur'an in its inother tongue.

Compounding the problem, many

western scholars have relied on translations that fit their

preconceptions of Islam, many of which are grounded in

empirical observation rather,than Scriptural analysis.

That

is to say, rather than deriving a viable concept of jihad

from comprehensive Qur'anic texts, many have instead looked
to the past to see how Muslims themselves have corrupted the
ideal and applied this corruption to their translations of

the corresponding Qur'ahic verses, or ayats.

This trend is

exemplified in N.J. Dawood's translation of the Qur'an,

especially when compared to the vastly superior work of
Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall.

In the introduction to his translation, Dawood candidly

admits, "In adhering to a rigidly literal rendering of
Arabic idioms, previous translations have, in my opinion,
practically failed to convey both the meaning and the

rhetorical grandeur of the original."^"

By whose criteria?

Ultimately, one must rely on Dawood's interpretation of
crucial ayats and the words he decides best convey their

purported meaning.

Despite Dawood's assurance that he has
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"taken pains to reproduce ...ambiguities wherever they occur

and...provided explanatory footnotes in order to avoid
turning the text into an interpretation", one is impressed

by the fact that, compared to Pickthall's translation,
Dawood's commentary is scant and the footnoting, in most
: places, relegated to a word or two.

For these and other

reasons, Pickthall's translation is the preferred text.

There is an additional challenge in Qur'anic citation

,

represented by the fact that orthodoxy in the early Islamic
community was maintained with some degree of fluidity.

The

apocryphal story of Umar, as he attempted to contest the
orthodoxy of Hisam's Qur'anic recitations, is illustrative
of the utilitarian purpose with which even Muhammad regarded
his own revalations.

This fluidity is not to be confused

with a casualness or disregard for truth; rather, it should
be acknowledged that the Prophet intended both an "exterior"
and an "interior" meaning for the content of his
revelation.

The "interior" interpretations of Islam would

become especially relevant to Shi'ite Muslims.

Additionally, Hadith literature suggests that the Prophet

relied on spontaneous recollection in recovering much of the

oral recitation of the Qur'an.^''^

Of course, this was a

technique singularly reserved for the person of Muhammad and
only extended to the following generations of religious
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theorists in the collection of Hadith, not Scriptural
sources.

This duality of meaning presents a problem for the

modern interpreter of the Qur'an, however, as the attempt to

restrict scriptural references to jihad to a single

interpretation fall short.

Some argued (in later treatises)

that Hadith literature was the definitive source for the

interpretation of jihad; for these sources, scriptural

justification played only a minor role.'

For all its

pretensions of objectivity, Dawood's translation itself
offers little in the way of alternative interpretations.
Pickthall, in his dedication to the original Arabic,

actually allows for a freer recitation of verses, and
consequently, the ease of use so desired by the Prophet.
This flexibility became a fundamental component of the

attempt to exploit the concept of jihad in an evolving
Islamic tradition that necessitated the development of an

offensive war strategy in the service of the theocratic
state.

Pre-Islamic Arabia

To demonstrate how jihad emerged as a defensive

strategy of Arab "real-politik", one must first cast a

glance backward into the pre-Islamic environment from which
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it sprang.

Even Westei^n historians do not deny that

competition for natural and economic resources in Arabia has
always been fierce.

A minor feature of this intensely

competitive environment, one that offered little other than

sport to the surrounding tribes competing for legitimacy and
status, was the razzia, or caravan raid.^^^

A far more

integral component of the pre-Islamic Arabian economy was
the establishment of urban cultic centers and pilgrimage

routes administered by the dominant tribal interests of any

given geographic location.

This was certainly the case in

Mecca, as it was the nerve center of Quraysh economic

activity in western Arabia.

It was thus the very survival

of the Quraysh tribe that Muhaiiimad threatened when he
directed his prophetic message toward Mecca, heaping scorn
on the pagan cults entertained there.

The Quraysh

recognized the nature of this threat and took extreme
measures to ensure its timely demise.

The enforcement of

traditional Meccan orthodoxy was pursued through a combined
mixture of harassment, religious ridicule, and economic

boycott of Muhammad's sympathizers.
Politically, tribal confederations were a source of

momentary power consolidation; more frequently, they
represented a divisive element in the Arabian Sociopolitical environment as they rarely held together the
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various economic interests involved.

More often than not,

tribes would estabiish ttuces with one another on:^n ad-hoc

basis, breaking the terms Of such agrddments when their
economic interests dictated other courses of action.-^®

Jihad in the Time of the Prophet

Faced with violent opposition, boycott, and the
treacherous waters of tribal politics, it is hardly

suprising that Muhammad was preoccupied with issues of

conflict, political administration, and loyalty in his

prophetic message.

It might even be said that Muhammad, in

the early days of Meccan opposition^ already perceived his
modest following to be under attack and, consequently, in a
state of war with Quraysh interests.

Some have deduced from

this that Muhammad clearly favored all-out war rather than
the state of "permanent disunity" created by the fragmented

coalitions typical of Arabian politics."^

Despite these

reservations, it is entirely possible that Islamic

militarism was a logical development, given the conditions
of extreme persecution experienced by the Muslim population
of Mecca.

•

It was under such pressure that the oath at Aqaba was

entered into, in 622 C.E., by parties loyal to the Prophet

:
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and by those who had requested his mediation in Yathrib
(Medina).

Indeed, the Hijra (flight from Mecca) that

occurred later that same year, itself has been seen by some

as the first expression of the Aqaba ideal in a defensive

action against the Quraysh.^^®

If this were so, then

Muhammad's subsequent use of the razzia against Quraysh

caravans merely represented another defensive tactic of war

against an aggressor.

Still, little about the razzias

resembled a holy struggle; indeed, they assumed the minor
function of status competiton typical of the traditional

Arabian political and economic environment.

Although much

has been made of Muhammad's interception of the caravan at

Nakhla, it seems little if any violence occurred as a result
of his decision to proceed with this policy.

Those who

maintain that the Nakhla raid presaged a period of conquest

and aggressive conversion allow themselves to be swayed by
the history of subsequent dynasties in their assessment of
Muhammad's motives.

Similarly, apologists find themselves

vulnerable to the charge that Muhammad was the supreme

pacifist.

Indeed, many Qur'anic verses were "remembered" by

the Prophet precisely at this period in time, justifying
razzia activity during generally acknowledged sacred months

of the year.

These verses, however, were arguably

intended to excuse the violation of tradition, not to preach
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the efficacy of holy war.

Far more important for the

develdpmeht of a holy Wat ideal were the events surrounding
the battle of Badr, fought in 624
Some have maintained that the skirmish at Badr

represented an expression of

strategy.

s developing offensive

inclined to interpret the ongoing

struggle against the Quraysh as a de facto war, see Badr as

a response to Quraysh aggression.

An alternate view regards

Badr as just another razzia gone awry."^

Despite these

differing interpretations of the event, one thing remains
clear: Muhammad and his followers won a convincing and

significant victory against overwhelming odds and they
attributed this to the intervention of God.

It is no coincidence, then, that the sanctification of

war in Islam occurred at precisely the moment when Muhammad
had established the first significant umma (Islamic

community) in Medina.

Upon his arrival in Medina, Muhammad

had been hailed by Arab and Jew alike as a mediating
influence in the fierce tribal wars that had punctuated the

city's existence.

Indeed, many had seen Islam as a unifying

ideal; one which could bring the disparate parties together

under a single political/religious banner.1®^

When the new

"ruling elite" was established in Medina, the foundations of
the first Islamic theocratic state were formed.
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This infant state had immediate internal problems to

attend to.

Among the original Jewish tribes that had

welcomed the Prophet into the Medinan community, were those

who now recognized the glaring differences between Judaism
and Islam.

These differences had, of course, been

exacerbated by Arabs still contemplating conversion to

Islam, only half weaned from the cultic practices of their
pagan heritage.

Such Arabs prevailed upon Muhammad to

change the direction of prayer (Qiblah) from Jerusalem to

Mecca, thereby incurring the mistrust of the previously
complacent Jewish community. When several of the Jewish
tribes (the Qurayzah and Nadir) attempted to aid the Meccan

army during its siege of Medina (the Battle of the Trench)
in 627 C.E., Muhammad responded harshly
The Medinan umma and Jewish tribes both comprehended

the ideological value of religion to the state;
consequently, it was hardly surprising that Muhammad
condemned the Nadir to exile and the Qurayzah to extinction ■
for their treason.

These punishments, Draconian as they

were, were prescribed by Judaic law itself and were in no

way indicative of Islamic "fanaticism".

Western assurances

that Muhammad's treatment of the Jews was indicative of

jihad theory (or even hostility to Judaism) fall short; the

Prophet's actions reflected not so much the Islamic ethic of
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war as they did traditional precepts of justice, and a

preoccupation with the political survival of the Islamic
. state.

Religion, however, was an acceptable and wellunderstood concept of unitive ideology in Arabian politics,
tied as it was to the cultic economy of tribal interests;

and, after Badr, the idea of holy warfare increasingly
became an indispensible propagandistic tool in the pursuit

of the "pre-determined ends" of Islamic government.

Despite

the religious propaganda of the emerging theocratic state,

the issues driving Islamic policies during this period were
as practical as any of the Modern Era.

Despite the

prevailing view in the west that Arabia subsequently
succumbed to the sword of Islam, the evidence seems to

suggest that the Prophet's political prestige proceeded far
in advance of his religious reform.
After the Meccan refusal to finish the offensive at

Uhud (625 C.E.), the Ummayad general, Abu Sufyan, had become

increasingly suspicious of his own allies.1®®

When the

battle of the Trench (a Quraysh offensive intended to crush
the infant Islamic state) resulted in the collapse of the

attacking army, Sufyan subsequently entered into secret
negotiations with Muhammad for the capitulation of Mecca.
Thus, the conquest of Mecca was accomplished without
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recourse to the sword.

As Sufyan and the Quraysh elite

converted en masse to the religion of the Prophet, they were

increasingly rewarded with generous treatment and access to
power.

The mass conversion of the Quraysh to Islam was to

result in two significant developments in Islamic politics.
First, it effectively tied Quraysh interests and influence

irrevocably to Islamic policies.

Second, it aroused the ire

of the Medinan population, among whom existed an

impoverished fighting class {ashab al-suffah).

This class

depended, to a large extent, on confiscated booty for their
very survival and had anticipated, among other things,
confiscation of Quraysh wealth.

the

The practical effect of

Quraysh influence was to direct Ummayad expansion toward
mercantile centers, like Ta'if, vital to the Meccan

economy.

The mounting prestige of figures like Sufyan (an

Umayyad) and Abu Bakr (a converted Ta'ifan bedouin) presaged
an imposition of parochial economic and political interests
upon the policies of Islamic government.

When expansion took place, it did so at the direction

of Meccan interests.

The impact of the Medinan community

was such that it influenced only the direction in which that
expansion took place.

As a concession to the economic

interests of the Medinan community (nominally responsible
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for the upkeep of the ashab al-suffah underclass), Muhammad
directed expeditions and raids into Byzantine territory to
the north (the Mutah campaign) in the hopes that Syrian

Arabs possessed the kind of moveable wealth so crucial to
his Medinan agenda.

These raids, it should be noted, were

conspicuously lacking in religious exhortation.

When these

raids failed to produce the expected economic benefits, the

Prophet, it is purported, devised the system of taxation

(repleat with

Qur'anic revelation as justification) which

defined the Islamic relationship with its allies and

minority populations (the jizyah tax)

Later forays, such

as the Tabuk campaign, were precipitated by Syrian and

Byzantine military threats, provoking a defensive response
from Mecca.

In short, by the time of Muhammad's supposed "conquest"
of Arabia, issues of war and peace were largely decided by
economic self-interest and political necessity, not

religious zeal or missionary fervor.

If religion was the

deciding factor, why did interior tribes of the Najd and the
coastal regions (Yemen, Bahrayn and Oman) remain untouched?
While Islam appealed as a unifying principle to the
Medinans, it remained the task of the "ruling elite"

established by the Prophet to bring the remaining tribes
under their jurisdiction.

Ill

War Policies of the Rashidun (623-661 C.E.)

Upon the death of Muhammad in 632, there was

considerable confusion in Mecca pertaining to the right of
succession.^®®

The eventual election of Abu Bakr to the

Caliphate initiated the reign of the rashidun, considered by
Sunni Muslims to be the first four "rightly guided" rulers

of the Islamic state subsequent to the Prophet.

According

to the Sunni tradition, Muhammad himself had left no clear

indication that he favored anyone for the position of

leadership in the Islamic state.

Among the varying

interests competing for the Caliphate were the Muhajarun,
(these were the original Meccan followers of Muhammad who
followed him to Medina), the Ansar (the Medinan converts),

and the newly converted Quraysh in Mecca.

Both Muhajarun

and Ansar distrusted one another, but not nearly as much as

they resented the power and influence wielded by those who
had so recently been their oppressors.

Factions in the

Muhajarun camp either favored Abu Ubaydah (Umar ibn al
Khattab's faction), Ali ibn Abi Talib (the Prophet's cousin)

or Abu Bakr.^®''

The Ansar clearly opposed the militaristic

agenda of the Meccans and would continue to do so under the

Caliphate of Abu Bakr (623-624 C.E.), gradually forming ties
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to the supporters of All.
Umar himself voiced criticism of the wars of the

Riddah, which effectively united the tribes of Arabia under

the banner of Islam.

Additionally, several prominent

Umayyad leaders (Abu Sufyan and Khalid b. Sa'id) represented
Quraysh opposition to Abu Bakr.

Nonetheless, Abu Bakr

enjoyed the powerful support of other members of the Quraysh
aristocracy, such as Khalid b. Al-Walid, Amr ibn Al-as,
Ikrimah ibn Abi Jahl, al-Ala ibn Al-Hadrami, and Yazid ibn

Abi Sufyan (the latter being the son of Abu Sufyan and

opposed to his preferences for Caliph)

With such

support, and the eventual capitulation of Umar, Abu Bakr was

easily elected to the Caliphate and implemented a policy of
militarism unheard of in the Prophet's time.

Abu Bakr and the Wars of the Riddah

It has been acknowledged that the wars of the riddah
were attempts to consolidate the political power of the

Islamic state in Arabia.^®®

They were necessary, from a

political perspective, because of the various opposition
movements that had emerged during Muhammad's rise to power.
In a similar phenomenon resembling that of the prophetic

expropriation of Judaic holy war themes during the divided
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kingdom (Chapter 2), Arab opponents of the Islamic state
masqueraded as prophets arguing their own rival
ideologies

Not only did these opponents advocate

opposition, they preached open insurrection.

The religious

exhortations of various "prophets" led to several
rebellions

Thus, it seems, the theocratic ideology of

holy war, once codified and institutionalized by the state,

became an instrument of popular resistance and social

change.

Of course, these movements gave Abu Bakr all the

justification he needed to proceed with a policy of
pacification.

Muhammad's policy on militancy had moved

gradually from a policy of non-aggression to one which
allowed Muslims to respond militarily even in sacred months,
eventually proclaiming the state's right to war against

those opposing the poll tax levied on non-Muslims {jizyah).
Abu Bakr's position was a radical departure from orthodoxy
in that he favored a clear policy of expansion.

It is clear

that he moved forcefully against the movements that opposed

him, including those that had not deemed it necessary to

object on religious grounds.

In these cases, it seems,

Abu Bakr was engaged in a blatant grab for political power,

despite the questionable orthodoxy of his position.
Once the consolidation of power in Arabia was complete,

Abu Bakr cast his gaze on Syria to the north.
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It is a

mistake to assume that Syria had always tempted the Muslims
from the time of the Prophet; it is far more likely that
Muhammad's ambitions in Syria never exceeded the bounds of

mere appeasment of the Medinan economy.

The initial Mutah

campaign was ill-advised and intended only to bring back
enough material to fulfill his obligations to the ashab al
suffah.

Abu Bakr's appetite, however, was considerably

larger.

In a way, a Syrian campaign was unavoidable; since the

flurry of military activity surrounding Muhammad's rise to

power and the wars of the riddah, Byzantine interest had
been drawn south and imperial armies sent to protect

southern Palestine.^°^

In 630 C.E., the Byzantines had

recovered their Syrian lands from Sassanid control, although
the effort had depleted imperial coffers to the extent that
the armies of Constantinople would have been hard pressed to

respond to any major military crisis.

Correspondingly,

Byzantine policy pursued a course of alliance building among
the Arab tribes of southern Syria, a development that

threatened the security of Medina and the bedouins to its
north.

Abu Bakr recognized the clear danger to the

Islamic state that this policy represented and implemented a

systematic "raiding campaign" in Syria in the hopes that it
would prevent the northern tribes and imperial armies from
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unifying against hiiti.^°^

in another of a remarkable string

of improbable victories, the re-assigned general Khalid ibn
al-Walid defeated the Byzantine army at Ajnadayn in 634

C.E., thereby facilitating the expansion of Islam into
Palestine

Besides the obvious strategic reasons for a Syrian

campaign, there were other criteria that motivated Abu Bakr
to pursue his policy.

First, the commercial contacts

maintained between Meccan and Syrian merchants, and their

respective markets, were extensive.^"®

Also, there were

political advantages to be gained in Palestine by a policy
of conquest; specifically, the extension of an Islamic

system of tribal alliances that would effectively counter
the influence of Constantinople

Several key elements, however, offered Abu Bakr the
chance to characterize this conflict as a holy war.

Predominant among these elements was the concept of an

Islamic presence in Al-Quds, or Jerusalem.

Given the

prominence of Jerusalem in Islamic worship (due to a

perceived shared history with the Judaic tradition), this

seemed to be a religious ideal and, indeed, Abu Bakr used it
as such in his attempt to unify the Arab armies.

Even in

the case of Jerusalem, however, there was a political

purpose to Abu Bakr's agenda.

If one understands religion
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to be an ideology of the theocratic state, then it follows,
that whatever strengthens that ideology also improves the
stability of the state.

Muhammad had clearly impressed upon

the Arab population its historical ties to the geneology and
faith of Abraham.

In this regard, Jerusalem was as

important an element of Islamic ideology as the concept of
one God; indeed, Jerusalem indicated the historical presence

of Allah in a community that had worshipped him long before
the advent of His latest prophet.

It also invoked the

political idea of Davidic theocracy, a concept of supreme

utilitarian advantage to Muhammad.

An Islamic presence in

this holy city could only reinforce the ideology that

supported the Caliph's government and present the Arabs with
a "manifest destiny", of sorts, in their efforts to expand
geographically.

Another element in the development of the Syrian
campaign as a holy struggle was the figure of Khalid ibn al-

Walid himself.

In the years directly preceding the Syrian

campaign, Khalid had worked extensively to consolidate
Islamic rule among the Arab tribes on the Iraqi border.
At times, his mission sent him across Sassanid borders as he
sought to elist the loyalties of Arabs settled on the right
bank of the Euphrates River.

Khalid's actions resulted in

Persian antagonism, but the ideology of Islam was an
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efficient means of unifying these Arabs against Persian

domination.

The ensuing struggle against the Sassanids and,

consequently, Khalid's own person, acquired and sustained an
aura of "holiness".

Upon Khalid's arrival in Syria, it was

a simple task for Abu Bakr to transfer this sense of a holy
mission to the general's campaign against the Byzantines.
Thus, in the Syrian expansion of Islam, despite its

political and economic basis, military aggression was
regarded in the popular vocabulary as a war for the glory of
God.-'^- ■

Expansion into Mesopotamia (modern day Iraq) was also

inspired by recognizable political and economic issues.

The

obvious threat of Sassanid invasion in the east (despite the

weakened condition of the Persian army) necessitated a

political presence there.

The extension of tribal alliances

and levying of taxes were another motivating factor.

The

profound economic significance of Mesopotamiann agricultural
regions was not lost upon the Islamic leadership (now
exerted by Umar ibn al-Kkattab after Abu Bakr's death in
634), and the victories at al-Qadisiyyah and Jalula in 637

C.E. ushered in an era of Islamic hegemony in Iraq.^"
Similar patterns of expansion, based on political and
economic expediency, were followed in the subsequent

invasions of Iran, Egypt, North Africa, and Spain.
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All too often, In the west, these campaigns have been

interpreted as expressions of jihad, because their Isiamic
practioners availed themselves of the theocratic ideology of
religion as a unifying principle and attracted converts
along the way.

It should be noted, that jihad was a

Qur'anic concept of limited aggression, utilized in defense

of the community and regulated by interpretation of Hadith.
"Holy war", on the other hand, was a political instrument,
soon to be a social institution, its practitioners

expropriating jihad theory for the implementation of and as

a justification for political violence and expansion.-"'' In
this sense, "holy war" did not fit the preconditions for

jihad, nor did it strictly adhere to the understanding of
the non-Islamic world as "the abode of war" (dar al-harb).

The interpretation of harb as either "war" or "unrest"

leaves open the possibility that peoples unapproached by
Islam simply lacked the spiritual "peace" accomplished
through submission to Allah.

"Holy War", as a mutant

aberration of Qur'anic jihad, actually achieved the more

uninspired distinction of qital, or petty fighting.

It has

long been suspected by mainstream Sunni Muslims that
Qur'anic citation itself could have been tainted by the

influence of later political figures. , Considerable debate

continues to this day concerning the alleged "insertion" of
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Qur'anic texts that support one sectariaU grdup over
anottier.^^®

Thus, it shpuid come as no surpri^

policies

of itbu Bakr, once initiated/ were pursued with renewed vigor
and determination by succeeding Caliphs.

Umar oversaw the

consoiidation of isiamic; power ^ in Syria and Iraq,, as Khaiid
won decisive batties at Damascus (635 C.E.) and Yarmuk (637

G.E.), The Sas$anid capitol at Ctesiphon succuinbed to the

invading Islamic: armies in 637 e.E., and, Jerusalem fell in

■folidwing: year.

Exerting Islamic military power in

another ecohomically}vital region, J^r ibn al^As led his
armies into Egypt,: conquering Pelusium., Heliopolis/ Babylon,
and Alexandria between the years 639 and 642 C.E

The election of UthmanibnAffan to the Caliphate, in

644, signalled the rise of the Umayyad family and a period
of intense conflict in Islamic politics.

Although Uthman,

third Caliph of the rashidun, was largely pre-occupied with
political administration and consolidation of Islamic power
in the new provinces, his supposed reversion to traditional
familial politics and favoritism resulted in his
assassination in 656.

The short lived Caliphate of Ali,

cherished by those who considered blood lines to the Prophet

to be paramount, resulted in little but further animosity

between Umayyad and Muhajarun interests.
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Despite efforts at

negotiation and an eventual stalemate at Siffin in 657, Ali
refused to punish the murderers of Uthman and was himself

assassinated by a disaffected Kufan in 661.^^®

A subsequent

agreement with Ali's son, Hasan, allowed Muawiyah ibn Abu
Sufyan (Uthman's cousin) to re-establish Umayyad control
over the Caliphate.

Umayyad Expansion (661-750 C.E.)

Once elevated to the Caliphate (in 661 C.E.), Muawiyah,

who shifted the political administration of the growing
Islamic empire to Damascus, embarked upon an ambitious

campaign that included: (1) a renewed attack upon Byzantium,
(2) a policy of westward expansion that focused on North

Africa and Spain, and (3) a policy of eastward expansion
that focused on India and China.

Although these campaigns

extended the hegemony of the faith, conversion was, as

always, non-compulsory.

The option afforded unbelievers

opposed to conversion was the imposition of the jizya^ or
poll tax, as a means of support for the political
administration of the Islamic state.

This and the

unrelenting moderation with which the Jewish and Christian
minority populations were treated by the invading armies of
Islam demonstrate the political and economic agendas that
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drove Islamic expansionist policy forward.

^

War" was occasiohaliy preached in the

heat of expansion, the religion of sound political

administration was more frequently practiced.

Thus/ the

issuers that ocGupied the attentions of Muawiyah were those

of "political and military affairs; tax collection; and
religious administration/ including courts and
endowments."221

Legal and judicial reform often took the

guise of religious reform, especially given the nature of
theocratic government (that is, the derivation of law from

spiritual sources).

An example of this was evident in

Ziyad's (Muawiyah's half-brother) speech to his constituents
in Basrah where he effectively wove the themes of God and

respect for the law into a powerful diatribe against
lawlessness.--

The single greatest effect Muawiyah had upon

perceptions of conflict within the Islamic community,
however, was in the appointment of his son, Yazid, as

successor to the Caliphate.

This set into motion a chain of

events that would result in a centuries long debate

concerning the legitimacy of Islamic leadership.
this conflict was the concept of martyrdom.
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Central to

A Brief Analysis of Martyrdom

Certainly, Muslims had witnessed the example of

martyrdom from their Christian brethren; the model of the
"soldier of Christ" defending Byzantine interests was well

impressed on the collective consciousness of Islam.

Despite

this, martyrdom has often been associated with the concept
of fanaticism in western secular thought.

It was and is,

however, an element of warfare no more dangerous than that

of the decorated veteran acknowledged for his bravery and
self-sacrifice in the field of battle.

What is the

difference between the Muslim who is convinced that his

conduct in war will win for him a special reward in heaven

and the patriotic soldier who, for love of God and country,
throws himself on a live grenade in an attempt to save his

companions?

In fact, nothing distinguishes the two acts

save ideology.

As an ideology of the theocratic state,

religion reduces the components of heroism to the concept of
martyrdom and utilizes it as a model for exemplary conduct
in war.

The difference lies in the conceptual definition of

martyrdom, not so much in its application in war.

As in

martyrdom, the emotional component of heroism is much more

dynamic than its theoretical expression.
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Thus, while it is

certainly true that the Qur'an articulated a cohesive theory

of martyrdom for the Islamic armies of the rashidun, it
would not be until the later events of the civil war that

the intense emotions associated with its applications in war

would assume mythic proportions.

After the attempt of

Husayn (Hasan's brother) to challenge Yazid for the

Caliphate, and the massacre of his forces at Karbala in 680
C.E., the Shi'at All (party of Ali) embued their struggle
with the ethic of martyrdom, far surpassing the traditional
Sunni understanding of the concept.

Following the death of Yazid (683), the Umayyad dynasty
entered into a state of stagnation and eventual decline.

No

less than twelve Umayyad Caliphs reigned in a period of

sixty-seven years; no more than three (abd al-Malik, alWalid I, and Hisham) ever retained the office for more than

four years.

In 747 C.E., various groups opposed to

Umayyad rule banded together with the descendants of alAbbas and challenged the ruling elite for the Caliphate.

In

this way, the focus of power shifted from Damascus to
Baghdad,

Abbasid "Jihad"

Precipitating the Abbasid revolt against the Umayyads
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in 747 C.E., there was general unrest and dissatisfaction in
the Islamic world regarding the policies of the Caliphate.

The Kharagites Of Khufa dissented based;on issues ;involving:

strict dbservance of the ;Qur'an.^^^

Many Muslims objected^ t

corruptioh: at the ^highest: levels:of Umayyad administration

and disagreed on fundamental religious issues such aa
justification by faith and the efficacy of good works.
criticism of the Caliphate mounted, the Abbasids joined the

Chorusgof dissent;, -accusing the Caliphate of "betraying the
real Islam".

These calls for religious reform were, to a

large extent, also; indicative,, of.va, political-

dissatisfaction.

.. A:;finahCia1, crisis, it seems,,- : iad, ^

plagued the Caliphate of Hisham abd al-Malik (724t743 C.E.)
and hampered the central administration's ability to
, effectively govern the frontiers

Additionally, there were concerns that the Umayyads had
increasingly favored Arab constituencies in an expanded

empire that included, among others, Greek, Persian, Indian,

Egyptian and Berber populations.'^®

Even among Arabs,

support seemed to be waning; after the Caliphates of Abd alMalik and al-Walid I (under whom Umayyad armies had ,

conquered Algeria, Morocco and parts of Spain), Islamic
expansion slowed considerably, leaving Arab trading
interests dissatisfied.^^®

Umayyad interests could have
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potentially appealed to one sector of the population against
the agendas of the others, so an effective ideology for the
opposition movement now coalesced under Abbasid control.
Perhaps this was why the Abbasids turned to the one
available source that offered them an ideology from which

they could "de-legitimize" Umayyad authority: Islam.
The religious argument apparently worked; in 750 C.E.,
the first Abbasid Caliph ruled from Baghdad.

A clear

indication that religion facilitated the implementation of

an Abbasid political agenda was demonstrated by the fate of
the Shi'i general, Abu-Muslim, who was executed for
"heresy", despite his contributions to the Abbasid cause.

Although Abbasid interests wooed Shi'i support with promises
of power, once the Umayyads were defeated Abu-Muslim was
seen as too great a threat and quickly eliminated.

The

pretense of "heresy" simply illustrated the Abbasid
inclination toward opportunism.

Similarly, the subsequent

liquidation of all Umayyads under Abbasid rule demonstrated
the new regime's utter disregard of Qur'anic prohibitions
regarding inter-Islamic conflicts

Despite the Abbasid reliance on religion as an ideology
of rebellion, the new dynasty was typified by a general lack

of expansionist policy and military ambition.

Perhaps

this was because of the fragmented state of the Islamic
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conraiunity itself*

Clearly

sectarian,differences iiad

increased since the unfortunate inteflude at Karbala, in 6§:0
C.E.; now political administration of the:Islamic empire
seemed almost impossible.
from Shi'is and

Faced with political pressure

isma'ills, (a Shi'i splinter group who

regarded Isma'il's son Muhammad as the seventh imam), the
focus of Abbasid government shifted from militarism to the
establishment of theological schools and an expression of
Islamic art and philosophy

This was done in effort to

create a mainstream Islamic culture that could effectively :

marginalize the influence of the "heretical" cults; over
time, this strategy was largely successful.

For the moment,

the Abbasids were less able to prevent the expropriation of
religious ideology by their enemies.

Political Upheaval in the Abbasid Empire (762-945 C.E.)

As the Islamic empire expanded and then stagnated,

various groups seeking the opportunity to create local

hegemonies emerged, utilizing the ideology of religion as a
unifying "nationalism".

Shi'ite partisans staged a

rebellion in Mecca and Basra in 762, followed by an uprising

in Morocco by Shi'i led Berbers in 788.

Similarly,

followers of Zayd, All's grandson, fermented unrest in
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TabaristaTi and Yemen.

In the;mid^n±nth; century C.E.,

Ismai'Ii opposition in Bahrain took shape in the form of a
Qarmation independence movement."^®

An aura of religious

charisma, approaching the political nature of a "cult of/

personality", surrounded the leader of the Qarmatidns

In

addition to Bahrain, Ismal'ills maintaihed a strong presence

in both Arabia and Syria, continuing political opposition to
Sunni leadership well into the Modern Era.

Similarly, the

Zanj rebellion in lower Iraq (a component of the Samanid
movement, 819-1005) featured eharismatic figures (al-Husayn

and al-Khujustani) who were jailed for "using the pulpits of
Khurasan to exhort the population to give allegiance to
Muhammad b. Tahir.""-''

Particularly in the eastern provinces, ruling elites

replaced one another with astonishing rapidity.

By 873, the

Taharid government of Sijistan was removed by its Saffarid
successors

In the tenth century C.E., Ismail'is in

Tunis and Egypt rebelled against Sunni leadership, resulting
in the establishment of a Fatimid dynasty (909-1171 C.E.)

that would eventually encompass parts of Syria and

Palestine

Consequently, the political situation of the

Abbasids, from the ninth century on, was dire; in fact, the

empire was in a state of absolute chaos, culminating in the

fall of Baghdad to the Shi'ite Buyids in 945.^'''
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In many

places, Abbasid control was only nominal; the jurisdiction
of the local dynasty took precedence over imperial ,
dbjectives.^''^

Despite the commotion caused by a

plethora of local disturbances, uprisings, and dynastic
changes, nothing shook the JUDbasid government down to its
very core as effectively as the arrival of the Turks.

The Ghazan Turks and the "Dar al-Harb"

Originally from the borders of central Asia, the

nomadic pastoral tribes that comprised the Turkish ethnic
unit, initially came into contact with the Abbasid Empire in
the ninth century

Surely, various Turkish groups had

converted to Islam even as far back as during the Umayyad

period, but it would be on Abbasid administrations that they
exerted the strongest influence.

Initially, there was

intense conflict, between the various Islamic dynasties that

had achieved a great degree of political, philosophical and
artistic sophistication and these rough, impulsive nomads
from the northeast

Gradually, as Turks were captured in

battle and tribute was taken in the form of child labor, a

generation of indoctrinated youth, taught in the ways of
Islam, emerged as a powerful influence in Turkish culture.
These new converts to Islam were utilized by the government
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as "border soldiers", or ghazis, in the effort to create a
buffer zone between the Mjbasids and the still uhcb

Turkish tribes.

Serving aS they were in the army of

Islam, these ghazis aGcepted the theocratic ideology of :

religion as it had developed in its purest fdrm; riamely, as;
a justification for the expansion and defense of Islam.
This made obYious sense to. thP^f for theirs was a culture
centered about the reality of conflict and war.

.Increasingly,
■
however,: as the,, task ef defending. Islamic . .
borders against pagan Turks became ever more crucial,

a

ghazah: "us and thein": inentality began to develop.:

From tfe beginning, Islam, had always.; incorporated the
ideas of a "Dar al^islam" (abode of peace) and a "Dar :al*Harb" (abode; Of cdnflict).i:Nbrmel

they had referred^ :t

the locations where the peace of God had been established
and those where confusion and ignorance still reigned.

Now,

as ghazan Turks struggled to defend the borders of the "Dar
al-Islam", it was easy to characterize the "Dar al-Harb" as

a place where war must be waged in order to establish peace.
As the militarism of ghazis increased, so their reliance on

Islamic religious ideology as a unitive element intensified,
resulting in a rearticulation of "Dar al-Harb" as the "abode

of war" peopled by unbelievers

This had certainly been

the understanding of the non-Islamic world in centuries
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past, but never with the same implications of organized
militarism.

The Seljuk Turks, converted in 960, were indespensible

to the ghazis in the struggle for the border; consequently,
they modeled their concepts of war based upon ghazan

doctrines.

By 1040, Seljuks had conquered Khurisan; in

1055, they sacked Baghdad and in short measure, they

acquired Azerbaijan, Armenia arid Anatolia (after the battle
of Manzikert in 1071)

These campaigns often took on the

aspect of a holy struggle, particularly those against the
Byzantines of Anatolia.

Holy war, as opposed to the

original concept of jihad, had now become an unabashedly

offensive strategy, wielded by a non-Arab power determined
to expand geographically.

In a way, the Seljuks resembled

the Caliphs of the Rashidun and Umayyad dynasties as they
tirelessly availed themselves of religious ideology in

pursuit of economic and geographic integrity, despite
Qur'anic regulations to the contrary.

This Seljuk domination Would help to further
institutionalize the idea of holy war as a concept eternally
consistent with the ends of Islamic government.

The

establishment of madrasas (religious schools) as
institutions of the state in which war propaganda was

disseminated typified Turkish administration of the Islamic
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uima.^^°

These schobis would becoirie the instrumeri| of ; ;

leaders such as Nur al-bin JVrslan Shah, or; Nureddin,

/r.1193^1211 G vE.l Whp;elaborated upon the idea ofV holy war
as a "complete theory, sketching out a precise political

path" for Islam.^^^

Motivated by obvious political niotiyes,

such as the exertion of his own influence upon the Abbasid

Caliphate, the capture of Damascus and the re-union of Mosul
and Aleppo, Nureddin refined the art of holy war to the

level it enjoys in the Modern Era as an ideology for various
political extremist groups.

Thus it was that, in addition

to his titles as "guardian of Allah's land" and "conqueror

of infidels and pagans", it could be said of Nureddin by his

"Whi1e a11 the other sovereigns .think of

nothingbut their empty worldly goods,
you [Nureddin] dedicate yourself to the
defense of religion"

As much could be said of his resolve to defend the Islamic
state.

T



The institution of the masdrasas facilitated the easy

dissemination of war rhetoric by succeeding dynasties,

v

Salah al-Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub, or Saladin (1169-93 C.E.)/

perhaps the most stereotyped figure in Islamic history,
became the inheritor of Nureddin's revival of holy war

themes.

His success, coupled with the fall of

Constantinople in 1453 to Mehmed the Conqueror, was

instrumental in the negative view that has prevailed in the

West regarding the Turks.

The period of Ottoman expansion

tljiat followed the Crusades only reinforced western views on
the militancy of Islam; despite the socio-religious
consciousness of the millet system that it introduced.

It

is a sad legacy that the fanaticism attributed to Islam was

largely the product of the early conquests and the inability
of the West to cope with the success of Turkish foreign
policy.

Thus, it is clear that that apart from the theoretical

development of jihad there existed an understanding of holy
war themes in Islamic culture.

These themes often strayed

from the profound practicality of the Prophet who saw
survival as the sole justification for his limited

militarism.

As the theory of jihad became the expedient

instrument with which to pursue economic and geographic
expansion for the Islamic theocratic state, holy wars were

regularly preached.

It should be noted, that the frequency

of holy war exhortation increased with the development of
theocratic institutions in Islamic culture.

This was due

largely to the increased pressures of political and economic
competition among various states in the Middle East and the

advent of European interests in the region;.
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"Survival" was

translate<i iiitd eqonomi^^ and political terms; consaquently,

holy war became effectively institutionalized by government

interests.

By strange coineidence, Islaniic jihad

was liberated from its Qur'anic limitations and inserted

into the realities of imperial policy and expansionism.

In

this way, "holy war" became an image of jihad magnified by
the successes of theocratic Islam.

■■

I
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CONCLUSION

Throughout history, societies have wrestied with issues
of conflict resolution.

Political and economic agendas have

determined how these societies pursued specific policies

that pcbasionally breached the rights and obligations of

other polities.

When the normal procedures for negotiating

disintegrated, war became, to paraphrase Isaac Asimov, the
"last refuge" of the incompetent.

At the same time, the

formulation of society has remained, for the most part, an

unconscious process.

No one (save the behavioralists of the

modern era) has attempted to consciously construct a

community with pre-conceived or fabricated norms and values.
In this regard, societies that have evolved into theocracies
have possessed their own particular strategic perspectives

in pursuit of the political and economic agendas essential
to survival.

Thus, when efforts to negotiate failed and war

ensued, theocracies utilized the ideology that formed the
very basis of their social system in order,to foster a sense
of cultural unity and "national" purpose.
As explained in my introduction, I use the term
"nation" to define a society possessed of the following
characteristics:
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

A highly centralized government,
a bureaucratic administration,
well defined geographic borders,
a complex economic system,
long distance trade, and

(6) a state i

All of these characteristics typified some ancient societies
and, I believe, qualified them as nations.

Theocratic

nations utilized religion as an ideology with as much
effectiveness as modern states pursue the ideals of

democracy, Marxism or absolutism.

Democracy is a political

system, Marxism an economic theory, absolutism a cultural
norm.

All have become state ideologies, however, and have

developed a mythic history that borders on the religious.
Pericles and the golden age of Athenian democracy still

inspire many in the west with a religious devotion.

The

Marxist heroes of the past, until very recently, occupied

their place in a community of saints whose earthly remains
were venerated in communist capitols everywhere.

Third

world dictators are parental symbols in societies where
obedience to authority is fearfully observed with a

:i

dedication usually reserved for father-god figures.

In what

way, then, may the theocratic ideology of religion be
. regarded as anything different?
■ ■ The reasons for waging war in the modern era have

seemed apparent.

,

The rhetoric sounds reasonable, precisely

because Sll are children of a particular ideology that

defines social purpose.

:

The. First Wptld'%r^ wad f

"make the world safe for democracy".

Westward expansion In

the United States, and its devasta:ting impact:oh native

populations, was an essential component of "manifest
destiny".

The monstrous policies of Josef Stalin were

intended to develop Russia as an industrialized economy (a ^

necessary prefequiSite for Mafxist ideoiogy). : To the casual
observer, the ideologies of democracy and Marxism might be

regarded as having exercised a type of fanaticism in pursuit
of their agendas.

How and why did religion become the

scapegoat for the fanaticism typical of many ideologies?
Perhaps it is because religion is more effective than

political/economic ideologies at convincing people to make
commitments to the ideological agenda; especially those that
entail sacrifice of life and limb.

All other ideologies are

bound to the here and now, the physical plane that

determines existence.

Only religion can offer the hope of

eterna1 reward and the solace of God's approval,

but how

much more fanatical is this concept than the typical American's faith in the U.S. Constitution?

;;

In a way,

religion• is^the ultimate state ideology. ^ History has indeed
proved the efficacy of religious ideology as a instrument of
f theocratic'rhetoric, especially in times of war.
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a concept that sought to

reinterpret the past in such a way that it would inspire
courage and conviction in crisis.

It developed in times of

extreme disunity, never fully realizing its potential as an

ideology.

Judaic holy war was almost entirely conceptual;

the troubled monarchies that sought to utilize its value

never achieved the unity of purpose they so desperately
desired.

As a conceptual device, however, it had fewer

restrictions placed on its definitions or applications.

God

had promised the land of Canaan to the Israelites; it was
the mission of every one of the faithful to kill, if

necessary, to keep it. ■The deaths at Masada stand as a grim
reminder of the legacy of Jewish nationalism.

Judaic '

scripture was produced concurrent to the trends in
theocratic ideology, mirroring and accentuating the themes
of holy war and nationalism.

Christian holy war developed only after a body of

scripture had been established.

Because of this fact,

Christian warfare was significantly restricted by the .

ambiguous statements attributed to Jesus.

This did not

prevent religious and secular leaders in Christian society
from developing realistic strategies consistent with the
ends of theocratic government.

The loyalty professed by

Roman Christians to the Empire of Constantino, the ,
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inndVatioilS of Augustine

articulated two theories of

Christian warfare), as well as the expansionist policies of

Charlemagne, clearly illustrate this point.

That is not say

that war waged by the Christian church was lacking in
scriptural authority.

Certainly, even the Crusades

initially possessed an element of Christian self-sacrifice
in the call to arms in defence of the Byzantines.

Although

"the crusades were arguably justifiable from a scriptural .
point of view, nothing could have vindicated the outcome.
In the end, political/economic issues (the cessation of

warring between western lords and the confiscation of booty)
served as more compelling reasons to fight.

It is perhaps

fortunate that, although none of Augustine's theories ever
achieved the status of doctrine, the clearest Christian

traditions acknowledging the possibility of Christian war
reflect his more moderate just war principle and eschew the
idea of war "at God's bidding".

This, of course, may be due

to the sobering realities of crusading and the diminishing
idealism that followed. ;
As a faith that stemmed from the revelations of one

man, Islam enjoyed a flexibility without parallel in the
: Judaic or Christian tradition.

Despite this, Qur'anic

sources have imposed a greater number of restrictions on the

waging of war than any of the other two monotheistic faiths.
Although Judaic holy war has had only limited historical

-'uy- ■

■■
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appliea,tion, theoretically it is unconstrained by
restrictions.

The-Christian church, though it now

acknowledges only one legitimate reason for war (i.e.
fulfillment of the just war conditions), has occasionally

allowed Augustine's less restrictive holy war theories to
prevail.
Due to the harsh realities of survival that faced the

early Islamic community, Muhammad was determined that

politically feasible, yet ethically defensible, model for
Islamic war be constructed.

This meant that he could employ

fluid methods in his recollection of Qur'anic revelation,

but also, that after each recollection the revelation became
more precise.

Thus, although it is possible to trace a

development in the Prophet's own thinking concerning Islamic
war, by the time of his death, the limitation of,Jihad was a
clearly established concept in scripture.

Orthodoxy among

mainstream sunni Muslims still requires that defensive

requirements be met, or that issues vital to the survival of
the Islamic community (treason, non-compliance with

taxation, and despotism) should be addressed in the

application of jihad.

Holy war, on the other hand, was

developed as a political instrument throughout Islamic
history, its practioners seeking to expropriate jihad
rhetoric but ignoring the scriptural justifications for its
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existence.

Because of the competitive environment in which

Islamic political independence grew, arid the increasingly
hostile reaction directed toward Islam from the West, the

causes for war are perhaps more imminent in the Arab world

than anywhere else.

In this regard, holy war could hardly

have retained the limited definition of jihad for very long.

Holy war is with us today.

As the political center

evaporates, extremism avails itself of the spiritual
absolutism of religious ideology.

The modern state of

Israel (whose established borders were determined by Ben-

Gurion using Biblical criteria) represents nothing less than
a modern example of theocratic government in operation.

The

claim to the land of Canaan by modern Israelis is still
based on divine covenant.

Similarly, so-called Christian

militias and political activists rally around the concept of

holy war in their respective struggles (witness the
religious rhetoric used to mask the political issues in
Northern Ireland).

Extremist groups, as apparent as their

political agendas are, still use religious ideology as a
unitive force in an environment of ethnically fractured

Islamic revival.

Despite Sunni and Shi'i, Persian and Arab,

North African and Asian cultural differences. Islamic

revival remains an ethical challenge to assimilationist

governments throughout the Muslim world.
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Politically, it is

perhaps the only hope for constituencies historically
oppressed both by domestic and foreign enemies.

Despite the chauvinism of Twentieth Century theorists, ;
it remains a sad fact that the modern age will be remembered

not only for its accomplishments, but for its brutality.
Recent studies have noted the rise in torture as a political

technique and ethnic rivalries in Boznia-Herzogovina have
illustrated the durability of.ancient conflicts.

Religious

ideology, with its holy war propaganda, should be placed in
its proper context alongside political and economic

ideologies as a force that has been implemented throughout
history with realistic and practical objectives in mind.

As

social movements inherited holy war themes from traditions
that had been founded on theocratic principles, religious

ideology became ever more entrenched.
interpreted as fanaticism.

Perhaps this has been

It is more probable that

fanaticism exists as a universal human characteristic that

lays dormant until the confluence of human events demands
action.

The survival of any human community depends on the

emotional investment of its members.

When that survival is

threatened, humans will fight desperately for the

continuation of a society in which they derive meaning.
Whether the meaning is political, economic, or religious,

matters little.

They will determine the efficacy of their
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struggle based on their respective traditions.
fight the holy war.
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They will
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tools of this policy [italics added].
84.

Schalit, p.118.

85. Doron Mendels, in The Rise Fall of Jewish Nationalism (New
York: Doubleday, 1992) p.164, documents that:
Unlike the armies of the Hellenistic princes, but like the
ones of the Nabataeans, the "army" created by Judas
Maccabeus about 168 B.C.E. was unique in that it was a
national army comprised of only Jewish soldiers, who fought
for a clear nationalistic purpose with which they
identified [italics added].
..

86.

Mendels, p.124.
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87. William Reuben Farmer, in Maccabees. Zealots and .losephus:
An inquiry into Jewish Nationalism in the Greco-Roman Period (New
York; Columbia University Press, 1956) p.84, quotes Philo's
testimony concerning the importance of the temple:

But all who attempt to violate their laws, or "to turn theiti
into ridicule, they detest as their bitterest enemies, and

they look upon each separate one of the commandments with
such reverence that, whether one ought to call it the

invariable good fortune or the happiness of the nation, they
have never been guilty of the violation of even the most

insignificant of them; but above all other observances their
zeal for their holy temple is the most prominent, and
vehement, and'universal feeling throughout the whole nation.
88.

Johnson, pgs.103-104.

89.

Mendels, pgs.58-60, records the political/religious nature

of the Maccabean resistance:

Then the army {parembole) moved and encamped to the south
of Emmaus. Judas encouraged his army, saying, "Gird

yourselves like brave men...it is better for us to die in
battle than to look upon the tragedies of our nation and our
sanctuary. But whatever be the will in Heaven, thus shall
he do".

90.

Mendels, p.124.

91.

Johnson, p.105.

92.

Mendels, p.199.

93. Mendels, p.192, delineates the difference between
religious/cultural and political domination:
Moreover, during the time under discussion Rome had no
intention of uprooting the national identities of the
peoples that it found in the East. Rome let them go on

living their daily lives, but exploited them economically
dominated them politically...Therefore the indigenous
populations continued to hold onto many of their :
/
nationalistic traits such as language, temple territory,
traditions, and history with practically no hindrance from
, ■ Rome.

■ ^'■ •■ ■ '

94. Farmer, p.104, is of the opinion that the Maccabees were a
constant reminder of the struggle for political independence in
the Judaic kingdom:

But if Antiochus Epiphanes was well-known in the Roman

period, how can we doubt that the Jews who led Israel to
ultimate victory over his armies were equally well-known?
This is, of course, a point we shall seek to demonstrate
in the following chapter, namely that the Maccabees were
remembered in the Roman period.
95.

Mendel, p.196.

96. Mendel, pgs.199-200, outlines the various groups that
existed at the time of the Roman occupation and either cooperated
with or opposed the regime:

During this period, within the Jewish society of Palestine,
there were essentially three attitudes regarding Jewish
nationalism...The first attitude was more open to

Hellensitic influence. This group included the liberal
element•to be found in the higher classes of Jewish society
and some of its intellectuals who favored Rome's rule in
the ecumene. The high priestly houses should also be

included in this group...The second attitude was held by all
those religious Jews who did not interfere in the politics
of their day, many of whom were Pharisees and Essenes, and
who wished to go on peacefully with their studies...The
third attitude was held by those Jews who were imbued with
strong nationalistic feelings and who did not give up the
desire for Jewish independence in Palestine.

97.

Mendel, p.199.

98.

Martin Warner, ed.

The Bible as Rhetoric: Studies in

Biblical Persuasion and Cresdibilitv (London: Routledge, 1990)
p.197.

99.

Firestone, p.104, asserts that "Because of its [holy war

theory's] formulation long after the consolidation of the nation,
fighting based on its specific formulation may have never
actually taken place".

100. Michael Walzer, in an article entitled "The Idea of Holy War
in Ancient Israel" (Journal of Religious Ethics, Fall^92 v.20)

pgs.223-224, claims that the mercenary nature of Josiah's army
prevented him from waging effective war against his neighbors.
This cannot be entirely true, for Judah Maccabeus possessed a
similar army and was able to prevail in his struggle against the
Seleucids.

101. Tertullian in his "Apologia", a segment of which appears in
Jean Comby's How to Read Church Historv. v.l (New York: The
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Crossroads Publishing Co., 1989) p.36, reminded Romans wary of
the Christian menace: "We sail with you, we serve as soldiers
with you and till the ground and engage in trade".

102. Henry ChaHwicV. The Earlv Church (London: Penguin Books,
1967) p.25-29.

103. St. Paul, in Eph"6:12-17 of the New American Bible, St.

Joseph's edition, (New York: Catholic Publishing Co., 1970)
exhorted Christians to:

Stand fast with truth as the belt around your waist, justice

as your breastplate, and zeal to propagate the gospel of
peace as your footgear,

St. Ignatius of Antioch, himself one of the second century
martyrs, echoed this Pauline sentiment in his "Letter to
Polycarp", included in Anne Fremantle's Treasury of Earlv
Christianity (New York: Mentor Books, 1960) p.42:

Let your baptism abide with you as your shield; your faith
as your helmet; your love as your spear; your patience as
your body armour.

104. St. Paul, in Rm.13:1-3 of the New American Bible stated that
it was the duty of every Christian to:

Obey the authorities that are over him, for there is no
authority except from God, and all authority that exists is
established by God.

St. Justin Martyr, on the other hand, in his "Dialogue with

Trypho", referenced in a multi-volumed work entitled The Fathers
of the Church, v.6 (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of
America, 1965) p.318, articulated the second century Christian
ideal:

And we who delighted in war, in the slaughter of one
another, and in every other kind of iniquity, have in
every part of the world converted our weapons into
implements of peace.
105. The New Thnerican Bible,(Mt.22:21).

106. Terullian's "Chaplet", translated by Edwin A. Quain in The
Fathers of the Church, v.40 (New York: Fathers of the Church

Inc., 1959) p.257, discussed the plight of previously baptised
Christians:

159

To leave the camp of light and enlist in the camp of
darkness means going over to the enemy. To be sure, the
case is different for those converted after they have been
bound to the military.

On a theoritical note, Tertullian, p.256, appealed to Christian
Scripture as well:

Is it likely we are permitted to carry a sword when our Lord
said that he who takes the sword will perish by the sword?

Will the son of peace who is forbidden to engage in a law
suit espouse the deeds of war?

107. Tertullian's oppostion (referenced in Quain's translation)
p.256, to military service based on anti-pagan sentiment rather
than pacifistic commitment is only too apparent in his concluding
remarks of the "Ghaplet":

Will [the Christian] stanguard before temples that he has
renounced? Will he eat at pagan banquets, which the

Apostle forbids?

Will he protect by night those very

demons whom in daytime he has put to flight by his
.exorcisms; leaning on a lance such as pierced the , side, of
Christ on the cross?

Will he bear too a standard hostile

to Christ?

108. Hippolytus, in his "Apostolic Tradition" (referenced in

Comby) pgs.49.-50, extended the restrictions of Christian service
in the army to those baptised after their enlistment; urging such
Christians to refrain from the taking of human life (37).
In an epistle sent to Diognetus in 200 C.E. (referenced in
Fremantle), an anonymous third century author concluded:
Force is not an attribute of God.

He sent Him as summoning,

not as persecuting; He sent Him as loving, not as Judging.
109. Mt.5:9 of the New American Bible lists among the

beatitudes,"Blest too are the peacemakers, they shall be called
sons of God."

Mt.26:52 reads, "Those who use the sword are

sooner or later destroyed by it."

Lk.6:27-28 exhorts Christians

to:

Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you; bless
those who curse you and pray for those who maltreat you.

When someone slaps you on one cheek, turn and give him the
other.

Jn.l8:36 recounts the words of Jesus as he was accused of :

political agitation:
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My kingdom does not belong to this world. If my kingdom
were of this world/ my subjects would be fighting [italics
added] to save me from being handed over to the Jews.
is, my kingdom is not here.

As it

110. Mt.8:5-13 of the New American Bible tells the storv of the
Roman centurion who asked Jesus to cure his servant. Jesus did

not require the centurion to resign his post, rather, he
commended him for his faith.

In Mt.10:34-36, Jesus announces:

Do not suppose that my mission is to spread peace. My
mission is to spread, not peace, but division. I have
come to set a man at odds with his father, a daughter with
her mother, a daughter-in-law with her mother-in-law: in
short, to make a man's enemies those of his own household.

The parable contained in Lk.l4:23 seems to suggest that the
element of force was not eschewed by God:

The master then said to the servant "Go out into the high

ways and along the hedgerows and force them to come in.

I

want my house to be full."

In a very ambigous discourse, contained in Lk.22:36, Jesus
remarked:

Now, however, the man who has a purse must carry it; the
same with the travelling bag. And the man without a sword
must sell his coat and buy one.

The wrath of Jesus visited upon the money-changers in the temple,
as discussed in Jn.2:15, was conveniently ignored by pacifist
perhaps because of its violent themes.
111. Even as late as the fifth century C.E., Augustine, in his
"Reply to Faustus the Manichaean" contained in Philip Schaff's
Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, v.4 (New

York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1901) p.221, could claim:
Most Christian sects, and, is well known, the Catholics,

pay no regard to what is prescribed in the writings of
Moses.

112. Even as early as the first century, St. Ignatius of Antioch,
in his "Letter to the Romans", recorded in Eusebius' The History
of the Church. G.A. Williamson, trans. (London: Penguin Books,
1988) p.146, wrote:
Let fire and cross, encounters with wild animals, tearing
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apart of bones, hacking of limbs, crushing of the whole
body, tortures of the devil, come upon me if only I might
attain to Jesus Christ♦

By the second century C.E., the connection between suffering and
Christian healing had become even more pronounced. In an
anonymous account of the the martyrdoms at Vienne and Lyons,

reproduced by Eusebius, pgs.196-197, the following descriptions
of various martyrs served as a powerful example:
But the blessed woman, wrestling magnificently, grew in

strength as she proclaimed her faith and found/ refreshment,

rest and insensibility to her sufferings. . .Thiis, through the
grace of Christ, his second spell on the rack proved to be
not punishment but cure [italics added] .. .On the rack she
came to her senses and, so to speak, awoke out of a deep

sleep, reminded by the brief chastisement of the eternal
punishment in Hell. . .from then on she insisted she was a
Christian [italics added] .

113. Michael Grant, The History of Rome (United States: Michael
Grant, 1978) p.405.

114. Comby, p.73.

115. The Chief historian of the period, Eusebius, p.414, relates:

Thus, all tyranny had been purged away [italics added] and
the kingdom that was theirs was preserved securely and
without question for Constantine and his sons alone. They,
having made it their first task to wipe the world clear from
hatred of God, rejoiced in the blessings that He had con
ferred upon them.
116. Comby, p.72.

117. From Augustine *s "Letters", referenced in Comby, p.74, we
have the following:

I do not propose to compel men to embrace the communion of
any party, but desire the truth to be made known to persons
who, in their search for it, are free from disquieting
apprehensions.
118. Chadwick, p.233.

119. From Augustine's "Letters", referenced in Comby, p.74..
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120. From St.; Vincent of Lerins' "A Commonitor:y"v Included in

Fremantley pgs.321-323. Other sources critical of Christian
militancy may be found in Fremantle's collection, pgs.31'7-319:
Socrates Scholasticus, in his "Murder of Hypatia", asserted:

The professors of Christian religion should be no fighters,

they ought to be fur frdia committing murder and bloodshed
with other such horrible offenses.

JUiticipating the pleas for laercy ti^ical of the Inquisitorial
Courts of the Late Medieval period by almost eight hundred years,
St. Martin (a prominent fifth century Christian) was said, by
Sulpicius Severus in his "St. Martin and the Condemnation of
Priscillan", p.319, to have: "Constantly pleaded with Maximus [a
prosecutor of heresy] not to shed the blood of the unfortunate
defendants."

121. In Augustine's "Letter to Publicola", referenced in
Fremantle, pgs.124-125, the learned scholar of Late Antiquity
maintained:

Everyone, as the Apostle says, hath his proper gift of God,
one after this manner, and another after that.

Some then,

in praying for you, fight against your invisible enemies;
you, in fighting for them, contend against the barbarians,
their visible enemies.

122. Augustine's' City of God, translated by Gerald G. Walsh, ,
Demetrius B. Zema, Grace Monahan and Daniel Honan (New York:
Image Books, 1958) p.447.

123. Although Augustine never used the term "holy war" in his
writings, it is clear, on p.57 of The Citv of God, what was
meant:

The same divine law which forbids the killing of a human

being allows certain exceptions [italics added]. As when
God authorizes killing by a general law or when he gives
an explicit commission to an individual for a limited time.
Since the agent of the authority is but a sword in the hand
[italics added], and is is not responsible for the killing,
it is in no way contrary to the commandment "Thou shalt not
kill" to wage war at God's bidding [italics added] of for
the representatives of the state's authority to put
criminals to death, according to the law or rule of rational
justice.
'b/
■
124. Orusius, in his "Seven Books of History Against the Pagans",
referenced in Comby, p.119, was of the opinion:
1
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:

.

It would seem that the mercy of God ought to be praised and

glorified in that so many nations would be receiving, even
at the cost of our own weakening, a knowledge of the truth
which they never could have had but for this opportunity.
125. Theodoric, in his "Letter to Unigis the Sword Bearer",
included in Brian Tierney's The Middle Ages:Sources of Medieval

History, v.1 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983) p.45, emphasized
the greater accomplishments of a king:

Let other kings desire the glory of battles won, of cities
taken, of ruins made; our purpose is, God helping us, so to
rule that our subjects shall grieve that they did not
earlier acquire the blessings of our dominion.
Regarding divergent views of religious ideas and principles,
Theodoric (same page) even appeared "open minded":
We cannot command the religion of our subjects, since no one
. can be forced to believe against his will. ■
126. From the "Letters of Leo the Great", contained in The

Fathers of the Churchi v.34 (Washington B.C.: Fathers of the
Church Inc., 1957) p.295.
127. Leo, in his "Letters", p.295, observed:

Although military service can be free from fault and

marriage can be honorable, to have given up the choice
of better things [italics added] is a sin.

128. Pope Felix II (482 C.E.) made the following claim in the
face of the Byzantine Imperium:

The Emperor is a son of the Church. In matters of faith he
must learn not teach. By God's will, the direction of the
Church belongs to the bishops, not to the civil power.
Karl Baus, Hans-Georg Beck, Eugen Ewig and Josef Vogt, The
Imperial Church from Constantine to the Early Middle Aaes.
contained in The History of the Church, v.2. Anselm Biggs, trans.
(New York: The Seabury Press, 1980) p.616. Hereafter cited as .
Biggs, V/2^v.'. - '' '
■ 129. Grant, p.454.: ;

130. Nineteen years before his conversion, ecclesiastical advice
to the Prankish king (referenced in Patrick Geary's Readings in
Medieval History (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 1989)

p.157, included the following:

^

Encourage your people, relieve the afflicted, proteGt
Widows/ hourish orphans, so shine forth that all may

v

'love; and/fear .you. ■ ;
131. Tierney, pgs.45-46.

■132. "'Biggsr. y.l'r ;.,p. 52-7 . ■ - '■/■ ■," ■ ..//■';■;

133. Biggs, v.2, p.528, offers ample evidence of the chaotic
state of sixth century affairs, as, for example, when the

Burgundians■reversed themselves and supported Theodoric in his
protection of Mediterranean lands from the emerging hegemony of
the Franks.

■ ■ .■^. ■;

134. Biggs, v.2, p.532.

135. The typical response to a perceived slight to Prankish
interests was recorded by Gregory of Tours in his "History of the
Franks", referenced in J.M. Wallace-Hadrill's The Long Haired ■
Kings (New York: Barnes & Noble Inc., 1962) p.133:

But Guntramn's implacable hatred, it must be emphasized, had
to do with avenging the death of Ingundis. He will not, he
says, receive an embassy from the Visigoth Reccared "donee
me Deus ulcisci iubeat de his inimicus" nether should his

V.

other niece, Chlodosind, go as bride to the land where her
sister was slain—"I cannot tolerate it that my niece
/ Ingundis should go unavenged".

136. Raymond Van Dam, in his authoritative work entitled, '
Leadership and Community in Late Antiaue Gaul (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1985) p.127, claims that:

,

/ ■ Martin's perspective on Christianity therefore not only
provided a model that renewed and redirected traditional
ideologies of authority onto himself, it also challenged ■
the position of Christian bishops who had adopted a more
accomodating attitude toward civil authority. , Martin saw
Christianity as a military service of its own competing with
the military and civil authorities; other bishops in Gaul,
who had always been civilians, were instead prepared to
; coexist with the military and civil authorities. In
Martin's bishops could, and perhaps should, take over the
functions of emperors and magistrates; in the alternative
perspective, bishops only advised emperors. Not
surprisingly, much of the opposition to him came from other
bishops. Although Martin eventually decided to keep his

distance by claiitiirig ttiat association with other bishops
diminished his spiritual power, his opponents in turn
asserted hhat he had "defiled himself with his military
actions"—an explicit comment on Martin's past but perhaps
also an implicit evaluation of his idea of militant
Christianity.

137. Edward James, in his The Franks (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1988), p.125, asserts that:

The difficulty for the Church, and for us, is that of
separating those customs which were genuinely non-Christian
from those which were simply deep-rooted social habits or
communal activities. Gregory reported that the Franks of
his day referred to dies dominions, the Lord's Day,
dimanche, as dies solis, Sunday: he and many churchmen of
his time regarded this as a shameful survival of pagan
worship. And yet, Mercurii dies, mercredi, Woden's day, and
Jovis dies, Jeudi, Thor's day, are still with us.
138. Biggs, v.2, p.629.

■,

139. Gregory's correspondence with the Emperor, referenced in
Tierney, p.65, demonstrates the emerging sense of "two armies"
(similar to the "two swords" theory) typical of this period:

Let your piety, either by interpretation or alteration,
modify the force of this law, since the army of my lords
against their enemies increases the more when the army of
God has been increased in prayer.

140. Tierney, p.99.
141. Tierney, p.100.
142. C. Warren Hollister, in his work entitled Medieval Europe. A
Short Historv. 6th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Co.,
1990) p.91, asserts:

But although Charlemagne respected the papacy, he was

unwilling to cast himself in the subordinate role papal
theory demanded of him. He was careful to retain the
title "King of the Franks and the Lombards" alongside his
new imperial title. When the time came to crown his son
emperor, Charles excluded the pope from the ceremony and
did the honors himself.

143. Norman F. Cantor, The Civilization of the Middle Aaes
York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993) p.81.
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144. Lewis Thorpe/ trans., Einhard's "The Life of Charlemagne",
contained in Two Lives of Charlemagne (Middlesex: Penguin Books,

19B31 ■p.;78./V
145. Thomas Bokenkotter, A Concise History of the Catholic ChUrch
(United States: Image Books, 1979) p.116.
146. A clear indication that Charles knew the value of religious

ideology ih the oreation of a political state is contained in the
Carolingian monarch's correspondence with Pope Leo. Upon hearing
papal criticisms of his tactics, Charles sent Leo ah angry
IpttAr^ referenced in The Catholic Encvclooedia. v.3, Charles G.
Herbermann, ed. (New York: The Encyclopedia Press, 1913) p.700:

My part is to defend the Church by force of arms from
external attacks and to secure her internally through
the establishment of the Catholic faith; your part is to
render us the assistance of prayer.

147. Freiderich Kempf, Hans-Georg Beck, Eugen Ewig and Josef
Adreas Jungman, The Church in the Acre of Feudalism, translated by
Anselm Biggs in The Historv of the Christian Church.; v.3 (New
York: Crossroads Publishing Co., 1982) pgs.131-132. Hereafter
cited as Biggs, v.3.

148. Biggs, v.3, pgs.138-139.
149. Biggs, v.3, p.141.
150. Biggs, v.3, p.295.

151. The intensity of Gregory's rhetoric against Henry was
evident in Paul of Bernried's account of the pope's

interpretation of a miraculous sign, included in Arnold Harris
Matthews'

The Life and Times of Hildebrand (London: Francis
Griffiths, 1910) p.109:

This was interpreted by the pope as follows: the egg was
the Church; the serpent, the emblem of evil, stood for

Gregory, in his correspondences referenced in Ephraim Emerton's
The Correspondence of Pope Gregory VII (New York: W.W. Norton and
Co., 1960) , ,p.101, would eventually appeal to Old Testament
■
justifications for war in his attempts to galvanize support among
the German nobles:

For as we are subject to the word of the prophet: "If thou
speakest not to warn the wicked from his wicked way. . .his
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r-

■-

:■

■

soul will I require at thine hand

"Gursed be lie

that shall hold back his sword from blood", that is, shall

hold back the sword of reproof from smiting those of evil
' ■ life.'-

.

Finally, in his Sppeal to the German nobility as referenced in
Emerton, p.101, Hildebrand declared:
But if he will not listen to you and shall choose to
follow the Delil rather than Christ and shall prefer

the counsel of those who have long been under excommunica
tion for simoniacal heresy to yours then we shall find
ways, under divine inspiration, to rescue the already
declining Church Universal by serving God rather than man.

152. For an excellent appraisal of Gregory's struggle with Henry
as a prototype of the holy war, or crusade, refer to the work of
Carl Erdmann: The Origin of the Idea of Crusading (Princeton;

Princeton University Press, 1977).
153. Biggs, v.3, p.445.

154. Biggs, v.3, p.445.
155. Steven Runciman, The First Crusade (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992) p.29.

156. Malcolm Billings, The Crusades (New York: Sterling
Publishing Co., 1996) p.19. '
157. The relevant sections of Urban's address, as referenced in
Tierney, pgs.155-156, are as follows:

Now that you, 0 sons of God, have consecrated yourselves to
God to maintain peace among yourselves more vigorously and
. to uphold the laws of the Church faithfully, there is work
to do, for you must turn the strength of your sincerity, now
that you are aroused by divine correction, to another affair
that concerns you and God. Hastening to the way, you must
help your brothers living in the Orient, who need your aid
for which they have already cried out many times. For, as
- most of you have been told, the Turks, a race of Persians,
who have penetrated within the boundaries of Romania even to
the Mediterranean to that point which they call the Arm of
Saint George, in occupying more and more of the lands of the
Christians, have overcome them, already victims of seven
battles, and have killed and captured them, have overthrown
churches, and have laid waste God's kingdom...Let those who
are accustomed to wage private wars wastefully, even against

'■

•
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believers, go forth against the infidels in a battle worthy
to be undertaken now and to be finished in victory.

Now,

let those who until recently existed as plunderers, be
soldiers of Christ; now let those who formerly contended

against brothers and relations, rightly fight barbarians...
Nay, more, the sorrowful here will be glad there, the poor
here will be rich there.

158. R■C■ Smai1. in his Crusading Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1967) p.18, declares the following:
It was Delbruck's opinion that the principles of strategy
could not be applied to Crusading warfare, because the
Crusades were born of mystical rather than political
motives. Certainly, the preaching of the First Crusade

appealed to Christian abhorrence of Islam; but from the
first other motives were present [italics added], and the
crusade included, beside Peter the Hermit, land hungry

Normans and the Genoese, eager to exploit commercial
opportunity.
159. Smail, p.18.

v

160. Jonathan Riley-Smith, The First Crusade and the Idea of
Crusading (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986)
pgs.55 and 61.

161. James M. Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade: 1213-1221
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986) p.53.
162. Frederick Russell, Just War in the Middle Aaes
Cambridge University Press, 1975) p.61.

(Cambridge:

163. Hollister, p.196.

164. This is to be distinguished from the concept of qital
(fighting) referenced in Kelsay and Johnson's Cross. Crescent and
Sword, p.37.

165. For the typical orientalist perspective of early Islamic
expansion, one need look no further than F.E. Peter's Muhammed
and the Origins of Islam (New York: State University of New York
Press, 1994) p.211: "Muhammed, with power now in his hands", ,
Peters asserts, "set his community on the path of aggressive
political violence." The apologetic view may be gleaned from
such authors as Hazrat Mirza Tahir Ahmad who admirably, .if

somewhat naively, argues for Islamic pacifism in his work
entitled Murder in the Name of Allah (Cambridge: Lutterworth
Press, 1989) p.18: "It is amazing that a Muslim scholar could

even by impiicatidn suggest that the prophet was guilty of a^
Hitler-style invasion-Waaudhu billah.

;

The Prophet was a . prince

of peace, not an invader."

166. N.J. Dawood, trans. The Koran (London: Penguin Books, 1994)
and Mohhamed Marmaduke Pickthall, trans, and comm. The Glorious
Koran (New York: Mentor Books, 1963). The following ayats, or
verses, serve as a compelling example of the disparity between
Dawood's and Pickthall's translations and indicate an apparent
bias on the part of DawOod in his treatment of jihad: 2:191-193
and 2:216.

In Dawood's translation, 2:191 reads as follows:

"Idolatry is more grievous than bloodshed." This obviously
infers that war may be waged (even offensively) against
idolaters, especially those who "offend" Allah. Contrast this
with Pickthall's translation of the same ayat: "Persecution is
worse than slaughter." The latter translation evidently stresses

violence as a response to oppression.

Even Kenneth Cragg, in his

Readings in the Our'an (London: Fount, 1988) p.229, admits an
alternative interpretation of the verse: "subversion is worse

than slaughter." Interestingly, both persecution and subversion
are elements of political environments, removed somewhat from the
religious agenda. Similarly, Dawood's translation of 1:93 reads:
"Fight against them until Idolatry is no more and God's religion
reigns supreme." Pickthall again delineates persecution, not .
idolatry, as the object of aggression and abjures Muslims to
fight "until religion is for Allah", a much less severe
qualification for the cessation of hostilities. In 2:216,
Dawood's translation maintains: "warfare is obligatory for you",
while Pickthall's affirms: "warfare is ordained for;you." The

first prescribes a clearly recognized duty of the Muslim to wage
war on God's behalf, while the second merely suggests it may be

one's fate, given the hostile environment of Quraysh oppression,
to fight. These are but three examples of a consistent trend
throughout Dawood's work in which variations in emphasis are
created, a word is added here, a word omitted there, meanings are
altered, thereby producing a sterotypical view of Islam in
western academia.

167. Dawood, p.xi. ■
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168. Dawood, p.xi.
169. John Burton.

The Collection of the Our'an (Cambridge: . ,

Cambridge University Press, 1977) p.151. Burton relates that
upon hearing Umar's and Hisam's conflicting recitations of;
Qur'anic verses, Muhammad is attributed to have said: "This
Qur'an was revealed to me in seven forms, so recite what is

easiest." Burtpn, it must be remembered, relies upon perhaps the
most widely regarded collection of Hadith (sayings of the
Prophet) in existence, namely, that of al-Bukhari.
170/ Thus, the Hadith of Ghatzali that admonishes, "Whoever

interprets the Qur'an according to his own opinion (bi^ra'yihi)
is to receive his place in the hell-fire,"referenced in Helmut

Gatje's The our''an and its Exegesis (Berkelev; University of
California Press, 1976) pgs.228-229, is to be regarded as an

expression of orthodoxy, within the dual context of Qur'anic
meaning (also Gatje's conclusion).

171. Burton, p.129, again relates the story contained in alBukhari's Hadith, in which Muhammad was spurred to sudden

recollection of a particular element of his revelation: "The
Messenger of God heard a man recite by night and said, 'May God
have mercy on that man! He has just reminded me of verse so-and
so that I had forgotten from Sura such-and-such."
172. John Wanshrouah. Quranic Studies; Sources and Methods of

Scriptural Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977)
p.170.

173. Fred McGraw Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1981) p.209.

174. Albert Hourani, in his History of the Arab Peoples

York: Warner Books, 1992) p.10, asserts that the razzia allowed
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Camhridae History of Tslam. edited by P.M. Holt, Ann K.S. Lambton
and Bernard Lewis, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970)
p.42, however, likens the razzia to "a kind of sport."
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Cambridge University Press, 1988) p.25.

176. Kenneth Cragg, The Event of the Our'an ,(London: George Allen
& Unwin Ltd, 1971) pgs.66-67.

177. Cragg. The Event of the Our'an. p.67.
178. Firestone, p.112, in his assessment of Qur'anic sanction of
political violence asserts:
It must be made clear, at this point, that while the

increasingly military positions sanctioned through divine
revelation correspond with the strength of the early Muslim
community and its ability ot wage war, an important
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attendant development was the increasingly aggressive effort
of the Meecan enemy to destroy the Muslims [italics added].
179. rraoa. in The Event Of the Our^ an, pas.66/ 131 and 134,

suggests: the Hijrah was the first of many tactics employed in a

pre-existing state of war: "The hostility of Mecca to Muhammad/
in the cause of the status quo, at length preciprtated the train.
of events which turned impasse into encounter and encounter ihto
triumph (italics added)i..It was thus that the Hijrah was saved

from heing a mere exodus of protest and emerged into active V :
measures agaihst Mecca, in pursuance of the pledges of "Aqaba
that had preceded it.

The frequent Quranic phrase hajaruwa

jahadu, "*they weht out in emig'^cation and they went forth in
struggle', now comes into prominence...The move out of Mecca with
the faith presages the move against Mecca for the faith."
180. The Cambridge History of Islam, v.1, pgs.42-43, asserts that
during the normal activities of a razzia:
Severe fighting was ususally avioded, for the favorite
tactic was to pounce unexpectedly on an isolated party of
herdsmen with force so overwhelming that resistance was
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■

one and taking two prisoners.

181. The Cambridge History of Islam, v.1, p.43 once more,
indicates that:
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A revelation was received (2.217/4) to the effect that,
while fighting in the sacred month was sinful, the
persecution of the Muslims by the pagan Meccans had
been even more sinful. This was followed by a general
acknowledgement of the raid to Nakhla, as it was called,
together with readiness to accept the consequences.

182. Robert Mantran, Great Dates in Islamic Historv (New York: ■
Facts on File Inc., 1996) p.5.

183. Ellas Shoufani, in his
Arabia (Toronto: University
identifies this perspective
contingent that declined to

Al-Riddah and the Muslim Conquest of
of Toronto Press, 1973) pgs.17-18,

with that portion of the Medinan
participate.

184. Shoufani, p.17, in his treatment of the Islamic
retrospective interpretation of the events at Badr, maintains
that:
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the Koran as well as in the tradition/ the story of Gabriel
at the head of an army of angels fighting on the Muslim
side is ubiquitious.
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201. Donner, p.85, in his assessment of the "false" prophetic
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led by the "false prophet" Talha b. Khalid, the opposition
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assartedl that the ; Syrian Gainpaign
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his The Crusaders.Warriors of God (New York: Harry N. Abrams,
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not be interpreted to mean that Abu Bakr followed with any

regularity the Qur'anic regulations concerning jihad, only that
he used the idea to pursue his own state policies.
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the wake of the phenomenal conquests achieved by Muslims
during the 1st (7th century), the scholars of Islam began to
apply the term jihad to military action and to efforts to
expand the sphere of Is1am {dar al-islam) through the
,
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222. Goldschmidt, p.57.
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237. Philip M. Fields, trans. The History of al-Tabari, v.37 (New
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; :

176

241. Goldschmidt, p.75.
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